Analysis of navy joint contingency contracting

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JOINT APPLIED PROJECT

Analysis of Navy Joint Contingency Contracting

By: Michael J. Garcia
    Curt R. LaRose
    December 2011

Advisors: Doug Brinkley,
          E. Cory Yoder, and
          Bryan Lundgren

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At the turn of the century and with the end of the cold war traditional twentieth century combat methods underwent a radical change. Armies no longer faced off over strategic pieces of land, but fought asymmetrical battles involving small-scale raids against one another in urban environments. This change required a smaller, more agile force that could respond to small-scale insurgent attacks. In order to achieve this smaller force, the services started to contract out auxiliary services, freeing up soldiers for combat.

With the rise of contracted auxiliary support came the need for experienced and qualified contracting personnel who could deploy with combat troops around the world to quickly provide the needed auxiliary support. In response to this need, Congress mandated the implementation of joint contingency contracting policies for combat operations in January 2008 (10 USC 2333).

With the new role of Navy personnel as Individual Augmentees (IA) supporting combat ground forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq, the need for experienced and qualified Navy Contracting Officers has increased. This report examines to what extent the Navy has implemented 10 USC 2333 and the impact it is having on Navy contracting officers.
ANALYSIS OF NAVY JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2011

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ANALYSIS OF NAVY JOINT CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

ABSTRACT

At the turn of the century and with the end of the cold war traditional twentieth century combat methods underwent a radical change. Armies no longer faced off over strategic pieces of land, but fought asymmetrical battles involving small-scale raids against one another in urban environments. This change required a smaller, more agile force that could respond to small-scale insurgent attacks. In order to achieve this smaller force, the services started to contract out auxiliary services, freeing up soldiers for combat.

With the rise of contracted auxiliary support came the need for experienced and qualified contracting personnel who could deploy with combat troops around the world to quickly provide the needed auxiliary support. In response to this need, Congress mandated the implementation of joint contingency contracting policies for combat operations in January 2008 (10 USC 2333).

With the new role of Navy personnel as Individual Augmentees (IA) supporting combat ground forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq, the need for experienced and qualified Navy Contracting Officers has increased. This report examines to what extent the Navy has implemented 10 USC 2333 and the impact it is having on Navy contracting officers.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Army Acquisition Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Acquisition and Contract Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECC</td>
<td>Army Expeditionary Contracting Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Acquisition Professional Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>Base Operations Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>BQC</td>
<td>Basic Qualification Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Civil Engineering Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEW</td>
<td>Civilian Expeditionary Workforce</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHB</td>
<td>Cargo Handling Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Community of Interest</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Concept Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Contracting Officer Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASN AP</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisitions and Procurement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAU</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition University</td>
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<td>DAWIA</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act</td>
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<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td>Guided Missile Destroyer</td>
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<td>DESRON</td>
<td>Destroyer Squadron</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOS</td>
<td>Economies of Scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Federal Acquisition Regulation</td>
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<td>FLC</td>
<td>Fleet Logistics Center</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Financial Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GLS</td>
<td>Global Logistics Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>Head of Contracting Activity/Authority</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Individual Augmentee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>Integrated Planner and Executer</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCASO</td>
<td>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operational Area</td>
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<td>JOCS</td>
<td>Joint Operational Contracting Support</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Specialty Officer</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>JTSCC</td>
<td>Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDO</td>
<td>Limited Duty Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Logistics Operation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civil Augmentation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSC</td>
<td>Lead Service Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Mission Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACO</td>
<td>Navy Acquisitions and Contracting Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVAIR</td>
<td>Naval Air Systems Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVFAC</td>
<td>Naval Facilities Engineering Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVICP</td>
<td>Naval Inventory Control Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVSEA</td>
<td>Naval Sea Systems Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVSUP</td>
<td>Naval Supply Systems Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NMCI</td>
<td>Navy/Marine Corps Intranet</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Operational Contracting Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>OJC</td>
<td>Operation JUST CAUSE</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOD</td>
<td>Operation ODYSSEY DAWN</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTAR</td>
<td>Operating Target</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Operations Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWC</td>
<td>Public Works Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request For Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATO</td>
<td>Scheduled Airlines Ticket Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Supply Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>Supply Chain Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEABEE</td>
<td>Construction Battalion</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>Senior Executive Service</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPECOPS</td>
<td>Special Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOT</td>
<td>Synchronized Pre-deployment &amp; Operational Tracker</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Third Country National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTTM</td>
<td>Yoder Three-Tier Model</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank our advisors, Professor Cory Yoder and LCDR Bryan Lundgren, for their guidance and commitment in assisting us with completing this project. We would also like to thank Dr. Doug Brinkley for his inspiration and expertise.

We would also like to thank our wives, Natalie and Michele, for believing in us and for supporting us through the long hours of research away from home. We couldn’t have done it without their patience, understanding and encouragement.

We especially wish to recognize and thank LCDR Emily Allen for graciously giving us her time and attention, and providing us information that we didn’t even realize was out there. She also went above and beyond by reviewing our data and providing critical reports. We are greatly in her debt.

Last but certainly not least, we are extremely honored and appreciative of all the senior officers who took time away from their busy schedules to talk to us. A special thank you goes to Dr. Gansler, RADM Wolfe, RDML MacLaren, RDML Crean, and CAPT Bailey for accepting our request for an interview, sharing their experiences, and providing us valuable insight into DoD policies, regulations, trends, and current operations.
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007, added section 2333 to Title 10 of the U.S. Code (USC) requiring the Secretary of Defense to “develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations.” This legislation has significant impact for the United States Navy.

This Joint Applied Project analyzed the extent to which the Navy has implemented the requirements of 10 USC 2333, which we will refer to as Joint Operational Contracting Support (JOCS), in support of contingency contracting operations. Our analysis looked at the roles and responsibilities of the Navy’s Supply Corps as well as the Civil Engineering Corps in Operational Contracting Support (OCS). We conducted semi-structured interviews with Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition policy and decision makers to investigate the Navy’s official posture in complying with JOCS requirements.

From our research, we have provided our analysis and recommendations to address the Navy’s status of meeting the requirements of JOCS in contingency contracting. Because JOCS addresses joint contingency contracting, we began our discussion with a brief synopsis of joint military operations leading up to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1984, followed by a history of the relationship between civilian contractors and military armed forces.

A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND PURPOSE

Both joint operations and contingency contracting have been key to the success or failure of military forces for centuries. During the Vietnam War, problems with jointness between the services became apparent which contributed to poor coordination and cohesiveness of effort. Further failures of the services acting in a joint manner finally led Congress to take action and pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1984. The military

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drawdown of the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, brought about a need for the Armed Forces to contract out basic support services. The military services failed to understand the role of contractors to military operations, which prompted Congress to amend 10 USC to incorporate section 2333 mandating the development of joint contingency contracting policies.

In 2007, the Army created an independent commission which was headed by Dr. Jacques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to review and recommend improvements to the Army’s policy and procedures in conducting acquisition and program management in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission’s report, “Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,” which later became known as the Gansler Report, was the catalyst to the Congressional action that added section 2333 to 10 USC.

Even though the Gansler Report was commissioned by the Army, the Secretary of Defense at the time, Robert Gates, determined that the findings of the Commission applied to all the military services in the DoD. The Army has provided the Commission regular updates regarding their implementation of JOCS, but the Navy has not. Since the establishment of JOCS, there has been no visibility of the Navy’s compliance.²

Our research provides the most up-to-date information on where the Navy stands on complying with JOCS.

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH

This Joint Applied Research Project evaluated the current Navy contracting structure and its response to the Congressional mandate of section 2333. The research and analysis provides visibility of the Navy’s joint contingency contracting policies and their ability to support OCS. We used our interviews and literature reviews of DoD and government reports to draw conclusions and develop recommendations for how the Navy can better support joint contingency contracting and train non-contracting military officers to better understand the role of contractor support.

²Dr. Jaques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 18, 2011.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Primary Question:

1) What is the current state of the Navy’s implementation of JOCS?

Subsidiary Questions:

1) What is JOCS and what are its requirements?
2) How is the Navy structured to address the requirements found in JOCS?
3) Does the Navy effectively train contracting officers to meet the experience and qualifications needed for Individual Augmentee (IA) support of contingency contracting?
4) What are the advancement opportunities of a Navy Supply Corps Officer who chooses a contracting career path?
5) What conclusions/recommendations will the research provide?

D. ORGANIZATION/METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

Research for this project was conducted through interviews of key DoD acquisition policy managers, as well as studies of literature pertaining to contingency contracting, joint operations, and the contracting support structures of the military services. We analyzed reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Congressional Research Service (CRS). Additional analysis was conducted using DoD Directives and Publications, and other documents including NPS theses.

The Yoder Three-Tier Model of OCS is also used as a theoretical foundation and guide for analysis.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

Chapter I identified the nature, scope and structure of the thesis. Chapter II provides a brief history of joint military operations, contractor support and how it relates to JOCS. Chapter III discusses the structure of Navy Contracting. Chapter IV lists our summary of interviews. Chapter V is our findings. Chapter VI is our recommendations and conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND

A. THE JOINT ENVIRONMENT

In order to understand the reason why Congress mandated the requirements of JOCS, one has to first look at the history of joint operations and contingency contracting. Up until the twentieth century, with the advent of air power, joint operations consisted of ground and naval forces acting together with defined and separate individual functions. These “joint operations” consisted mostly of naval forces providing troop transport and logistical resupply, then added naval bombardment with the advent of gunpowder and cannons in the fourteenth century.

American military services have been conducting joint operations since the Revolutionary War. One of the most important battles of the American Revolutionary War, the Battle of Yorktown, was a joint American-French operation that used both land and naval forces.3 The French Fleet from the West Indies blockaded the Chesapeake Bay preventing a British retreat, while General George Washington led a land assault on British fortifications.4 The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown was credited as the seminal event in bringing about the end of the Revolutionary War two years later.5

There were several key victories in the Civil War as well that were accomplished through joint Navy-Army operations, such as General Grant’s captures of Fort Donelson on the Tennessee River and Fort Henry on the Cumberland River. Admiral Porter also assisted General Grant in the capture of Vicksburg on the Mississippi River.6

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These early operations were rudimentary in nature, however, and the Navy and Army units generally did their own planning independently of each other. General Grant, when asked how Admiral Porter was going to make it past the Vicksburg batteries, stated, “that is the Admiral’s affair.”

The land and sea forces had great autonomy in deciding how to carry out combined battle plans. The limited means of communication, such as semaphore, was a major reason for the autonomy and the separate military services had to trust that the battles would go as planned. But as the German military strategist, Helmuth von Moltke, noted, “no battle plan survives contact with the enemy.” The invention of wireless communication at the end of the nineteenth century by Marconi was a turning point in the coordination of joint operations.

World War II and the Korean War saw the birth of modern day joint operations. Not only did the military combine all of the land, air and sea components into one fighting force, but also combined the militaries of the various allied nations into the same fighting force with one overall allied commander of forces.

This new joint operation used naval gunfire to bombard shore defenses while transporting amphibious assault forces. Meanwhile, air forces provided close-in ground support for advancing ground troops, as well as aerial resupply of ground troops. In the Pacific Theatre, naval aviation also provided close-in ground support.

The Normandy invasion of WWII was a classic example of the new joint operations with all Allied services acting under the command of General Eisenhower, the

7 Ibid.
8 Daniel J. Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings ( New York: Presidio Press, 1993), 45–47.
Supreme Allied Commander. Over in the Pacific, the same joint doctrine was being used by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz as they island-hopped towards Japan.

General MacArthur, during the Korean War, was the United Nations Commander, having full charge of all military forces participating in the defense of South Korea. The amphibious landings at Inchon continued to show how successful joint military operations were.

During the Vietnam War, the services neglected the lessons learned from World War II and the Korean War regarding joint operations. According to General David Jones, USAF, who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978 to 1982, “each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself.”

The lack of collaboration amongst services continued throughout the 1970s and was one of the contributing factors to the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980. According to the Holloway Report on Operation Eagle Claw, the lack of a well-established Joint Task Force resulted in an ad hoc organization of military officers lacking professional expertise in joint planning.

Even after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw as outlined in the Holloway report, a similar failure occurred in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983. An ad hoc Joint Task Force made up mostly of blue water Naval officers was cobbled together to plan a green force operation of Army and Marine land units.

Naval aviation was tasked with providing close-in ground support for Army units. However, the two military services used incompatible communications equipment, which prevented the Army from coordinating with the Navy pilots and led to a serious friendly

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11 Ibid.
fire incident. Navy A-7 Corsairs mistakenly attacked the brigade headquarters (HQ) of the 82d Airborne Division, wounding 17 soldiers.15

These repeated failures in joint coordination led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Barry Goldwater, a Senator from Arizona, and his co-sponsor William Nichols, a Representative from Alabama, introduced sweeping legislation that reorganized the DoD in response to inter-service rivalries which surfaced during the Vietnam War and were impeding successful military operations. They believed that all future military operations would be conducted jointly; therefore, each military service needed to create a culture within their officer corps, consisting of common attitudes, values and beliefs toward joint service.

The Act created a new category of officers termed Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs). These officers were to be “particularly trained in, and oriented towards, joint matters.” The law required that the Secretary of Defense define the term “joint duty assignment” and limit the definition to assignments in which an officer “gains a significant experience in joint matters.”16

The five key provisions of the Act were:

- Increase the quality of officers in joint assignments;
- Enhance the stability and increase the joint experience of officers in joint assignments;
- Enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters and strengthen the focus of professional military education in preparing officers for Joint Duty Assignment positions;
- Ensure that general/flag officers are well-rounded in joint matters; and
- Ensure that officers are not disadvantaged by joint service.

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The Act also instituted joint military procurement to correct communication deficiencies brought about by the services using different communications equipment, invested overall operational authority with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and individual combatant commanders, and relegate the individual services’ Chiefs of Staff to advisory roles.

Operation Just Cause (OJC) was the first test of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In 1989, the Panamanian dictator, Manuel Noriega, refused to accept the results of his country’s general election. Noriega was also involved in international drug trafficking.

In response to the U.S. State Department’s efforts to pressure him to relinquish power, Noriega threatened to close off the Panama Canal and started to harass U.S. military personnel stationed in Panama. After Panamanian forces killed a U.S. service member, the U.S. invaded Panama and deposed Noriega in OJC.

The planning for OJC was given over to the Army because the operation was going to be primarily an Army operation with support from the other services. This has become the joint operation model since; the military service with the largest composition of personnel involved is given charge of the overall operation. This meant that the planning for OJC was not going to be conducted by an ad hoc planning group thrown together from all four services as had been done in the past.

According to Ronald H. Cole, writing in the Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2003, “Just Cause was more successful than Urgent Fury. It showed substantial improvement in joint planning and execution. Part of that stemmed from the Goldwater-Nichols Act...”17

B. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

Definition of Contingency

According to 10 USC 101 (13)(a), a contingency is a military operation formally declared by the Secretary of Defense which authorizes the use of American military

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personnel against enemy forces. Subsection (b) also provides the President and/or Congress the authority to declare contingencies in response to man-made or natural disasters in which military personnel are mobilized to provide assistance.

Contingency contracting is a function of providing goods and services in support of contingency operations.

**History**

Contingency contracting is not so much a new military science as it is a rediscovered part of military operations. Historically, militaries have relied on civilians to perform non-combat services such as cooking, cleaning and mending services. Traditionally, these camp followers were not part of the military nor were they contracted, but were hired by individual soldiers.

There were other jobs, however, that were contracted by armies throughout history. For the first three centuries of the use of cannons in warfare, cannon teams were made up of civilians. LtCol Charles Henry Owens, in an artillery manual, stated that, “Princes seldom maintained as many cannoneers as were necessary for a campaign: they borrowed them from foreign princes or towns.”18 This was an early example of contracting out military work. The reason for this was the higher cost of maintaining cannoneers that had a specialized skill set.

During the American Revolution, in a letter to General Knox, General George Washington lamented the need to feed the women and children of soldiers who followed their husbands, but acquiesced out of necessity to maintain morale and recruitment. 19 Furthermore, the Continental Army hired civilians to “serve in key staff and logistics positions, releasing soldiers and officers for combat.”20

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As technology improved, the need for more contractors with specialized skills increased as well. For example, during the American Civil War, the Army added drovers and telegraph operators to the mix of civilian contractors.21

The contracting of civilian personnel, in working with militaries, throughout history has been a balance between freeing up troops for combat and finding the most cost-efficient way of providing for the daily needs of the military.

The civilian contractor working and living amongst the military drastically declined throughout most of the twentieth century. Evolving tactics and weaponry made it too hazardous for civilians to be close to battlefields. Armies no longer marched out onto open battlefields and shot at each other with muskets while camp followers stayed back at the camp. New technology made it possible to launch full scale artillery assaults miles away that could easily land inside of an enemy’s camp, killing indiscriminately. The introduction of poison gas added to the indiscriminate carnage of twentieth century war, and the introduction of air warfare changed military tactics to include the targeting of enemy encampments with strategic bombing.

Another point that added to the decline in civilian employment by twentieth century militaries was the lack of control by military commanders over civilians. Civilians were not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)22. Generally, the most a commander could do to punish a civilian was to banish them from the military post or camp.23

These two issues led to the military taking over many of the duties of civilian camp followers, including cooking, driving, and cleaning. This took soldiers off the battlefield to fulfill the roles that had once been done by civilians.

This trend of using military personnel to provide basic support services started to reverse itself by the end of the twentieth century as the Cold War came to an end. The

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21 Ibid.
22 The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ, 64 statute 109, 10 USC Chapter 47), is the foundation of military law in the United States that establishes the rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.
23 Ibid.
twentieth century way of war gave way to asymmetrical insurgencies consisting of small bands of guerrillas as demonstrated in Algeria and Vietnam.

The American military no longer needed a huge conventional Army that could be self sufficient, but needed an agile rapid response Army that could operate in urban settings.

At the same time that tactics and strategies were changing, the American people were looking to reduce military spending in the aftermath of the Cold War. This led once again to the search for the right civilian-military mix that would provide the most cost-effective military to counter the modern asymmetrical threat.

The most obvious solution was to contract out the tertiary roles, such as cooking and maintenance services, to cheaper labor that could be provided by third country nationals (TCN) or local host nationals. The military even went so far as to contract out security services to TCNs. For every TCN contracted, the military could free up a soldier for combat duty or cut a billet to save money.

The shift towards contracting out basic support services brought forth new problems. Military senior leadership, who rose up through the ranks at the end of the twentieth century and were used to the military providing organic support, failed to take into account the need for experienced contractors when planning contingency operations. This tunnel vision also led to a drastic reduction in organic contracting personnel. When the military services were ordered to cut personnel, Generals who did not understand the importance of contracting services chose to cut contracting personnel in favor of sparing combat troops. From 1990 to 1996, the Army reduced contracting personnel from 10,000 to 5,500, which has remained constant throughout the last decade, but the workload for contracting personnel has increased sevenfold. Figure 1 further shows the reduction of Army acquisition workforce personnel starting in 1990 while the procurement budget increased starting in 1996.

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25 Ibid.
The GAO, in a November 2008 report, noted that the military services had failed to adequately plan for the use of contractors in joint contingency environments. Other issues noted in the report included poorly defined or changing requirements, a lack of deployable contracting personnel with contingency contracting experience, and difficulties in coordinating contracts and contract management.  

The need for experienced contingency contractors first became obvious during the Balkan Conflicts in the 1990s. The February 1997 GAO report, *Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program*, found that the Army had established “little doctrine on how to manage contractor resources and

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26 Ibid.


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effectively integrate them with force structure units.” 28 Furthermore, CDR (Ret) Cory Yoder, who served as the Director and Chief of Logistics, HQ, Allied Forces Southern Command, during Operation EAGLE EYE in Kosovo, noted that “[r]obust contracting was something we just didn’t have.”29

Further contracting difficulties, as cited in the Gansler Report, during the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns30 led congress to add section 2333 to title 10 USC.

C. WHAT IS JOCS?

In 2007, the Secretary of the Army created the “Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations.” The purpose of the commission was to evaluate lessons learned from recent military operations throughout Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan, and “provide forward-looking recommendations to ensure that future military operations achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency.”31

The report identified several key issues in regards to contingency contracting.32 These issues included:

- Organizational structure – the Army does not understand the role of contractors and contracting personnel in a contingency environment;
- Manpower – there is insufficient number of trained and experienced acquisition personnel to meet the increased demands of contingency operations, to include contract management and oversight; and
- Lack of planning – the Army failed to incorporate contracting personnel in the planning phase of recent contingency operations.

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31 Ibid.

32 The report used expeditionary in place of contingency as the commissioners felt that the word expeditionary was a broader term and would encompass future domestic and international defense and security missions. In our report we will use the term contingency to stay in line with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and 10 USC 101(a)(13) definition.
In response to these key issues, the Commission recommended that the Army:

- Increase stature, quantity, and career development of contracting personnel; military and civilian;
- Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management in [contingency] and Continental U.S. (CONUS) operations;
- Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in [contingency] operations; and
- Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in [contingency] operations.

Acting upon the Commission’s report, Congress, in the Defense Authorization Act of 2007, added section 2333 into 10 USC. Even though the report had been commissioned by the Secretary of the Army, the U.S. Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense, together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop joint policies with regards to contingency contracting, to include pre-planning of contingencies and post-conflict operations.

JOCS mandates the following key requirements:

1. Appoint a senior commissioned military officer (Flag Officer) or Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to define, coordinate, and implement contingency contracting requirements during all phases of contingency operations.

2. Appoint a senior commissioned military officer (Flag Officer) or Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of program management and head of contingency contracting during all phases of contingency operations, to include stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple United States Government agencies and international organizations.

3. Identify a cadre of deployable acquisition experts in program management and contingency contracting with the appropriate training and authority to execute contracts in a contingency environment.

4. Create Defense Acquisition University (DAU) training in contingency contracting operations for program management and contingency contracting personnel.

5. Ensure that program management and contingency contracting personnel receive continuous contingency contracting training, even when not deployed in a contingency environment.

6. Take all steps necessary to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination.
7. Training of all non-acquisition military personnel who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities, such as oversight of contracts and/or contractors during all phases of contingency operations.

8. Include contractors and contract operations in mission readiness exercises for operations that will require contracting and contractor support.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF NAVY CONTRACTING

In order to answer the question, “What is the current state of the Navy’s implementation of JOCS?” one must first understand how the Navy is structured to conduct contracting and the kind of contracting the Navy does.

First and foremost, the Navy is a Maritime Force with a sea-going mission. As stated in the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the Navy, in conjunction with the Marines and Coast Guard, will “[maintain] a powerful fleet—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack.”33

There are two contracting communities which support the Navy’s maritime operational mission. The Navy Supply Corps (SC), under the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), awards and administers contracts for goods and services. The Navy Civil Engineering Corps (CEC), under the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), awards and administers contracts for construction and engineering, as well as Base Operations Support (BOS) services.

NAVSUP’s Global Logistics Services (GLS) in San Diego, CA provides services such as:

- Ship Husbanding and Port Services;
- Navy Advertising;
- Logistics/Professional and Technical Services;
- Galley and Laundry Services;
- Scheduled Airlines Ticketing Office (SATO) Travel;
- Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) Orders;
- Wireless Services, and much more.

NAVSUP GLS contracts goods and services world-wide through their seven regional offices called Fleet Logistics Centers (FLC). The seven regional FLCs are:

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• NAVSUP FLC Jacksonville, FL;
• NAVSUP FLC Pearl Harbor, HI;
• NAVSUP FLC Puget Sound, Bremerton, WA;
• NAVSUP FLC Norfolk, VA (Hampton Roads site and Philadelphia, PA site);
• NAVSUP FLC San Diego, CA;
• NAVSUP FLC Sigonella, Naples, Italy; and
• NAVSUP FLC Yokosuka, Japan.

With an acquisition workforce of over 24,000 civilian employees and 345 military personnel, GLS awards from 85,000 to 88,000 contracts worth $3.6B to $4.4B annually.\textsuperscript{34}

Unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy has retained an organic support structure throughout the Fleet. By the nature of the Navy concept of operations, ships must be largely self-supporting. When ships and submarines deploy, they have military personnel assigned to perform support duties, to include cooking, laundry service, maintenance, and administrative functions. When Army and Air Force personnel deploy, they contract out these same support services.

Furthermore, when Navy ships pull into foreign ports, port services are contracted out through local husbanding agents via husbanding contracts that have already been established and are administered by the FLCs.

The contracting structure that the Navy uses through NAVSUP, along with each ship and submarine in the Fleet using its own organic support services, means that contingency contracting has not been a primary concern for the Navy. According to CAPT Kenneth McKinley, “two Navy aircraft carriers support 45% of all Afghan sorties without contractors.”\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} NAVSUP website, Contracting. Retrieved October 9, 2011 from http://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup/capabilities/contracting_service

\textsuperscript{35} CAPT Kenneth McKinley, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development and Acquisitions, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey CA, October 23, 2011.
A. THE NAVY SUPPLY CORPS

The mission of the Navy Supply Corps, as set forth by the former Chief of the
Supply Corps, Rear Admiral Lyden, is to “support of the Navy’s Maritime Strategy at the
tactical, operational and strategic levels…” This is achieved by “delivering sustained
global logistics capabilities to the Navy and Joint Warfighter.”

The most recent listing of Navy Supply Corps billets shows the following, by
designators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designator</th>
<th>Authorized Billets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3100 (Regular Active Duty)</td>
<td>2309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3107 (Full Time Support)</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3105 (Selected Reserves)</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>651X (Limited Duty Officer (LDO))</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7510 (Supply Corps Warrant Officer)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7520 (Food Service Warrant Officer)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of all Supply Corps Officers, only those with the 3100 and 3105 designators are
eligible to receive the 1306 subspecialty code designator. A 1306 subspecialty denotes a
naval officer who has met the educational and/or training requirements for acquisition
and contract management, and makes him/her eligible to perform the duties of a
contracting officer.

As stated, the mission of the Supply Corps is to provide logistical support to the
Fleet. After receiving their commission, Supply Corps Officers are taught introductory
skills in food service management; inventory management, including stock control and
financial management of a ship’s Operating Target (OPTAR) funds; ships services
management, to include managing a ship’s store and laundry services; and disbursing at
the Basic Qualification Course (BQC). Junior Supply Corps Officers take these skills that
they learn at BQC and apply them in the Fleet.

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36 Navy Supply Corps, Strategic Guidance 2011, 1.
37 Manual Of Navy Officer Manpower And Personnel Classifications Volume I, Part B. Retrieved
A typical Supply Corps Officer’s career path is as follows (see Figure 2). The first tour after BQC is usually an operational tour meant to expose Supply Corps Officers to the various communities in the Navy, such as submarine, surface, aviation, special operations (SPECOPS), or Construction Battalions (SeaBees). The term “operational” generally denotes “sea duty” as a member of a ship’s crew; but with the decrease in the number of ships in the Fleet and added emphasis to expeditionary logistics, a few shore assignments have been designated as operational, such as SPECOPS, SeaBees and Cargo Handling Battalions (CHB).

![Career Progression](image)

**Figure 2. SC Career Progression**

In order to be of use throughout the Fleet, the Supply Corps encourages junior officers to gain a wide range of experience; therefore, a Supply Corps Officer’s second

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tour may include an internship, overseas assignment, IA to the Army or Marine Corps, instructor duty, Admiral’s aide and various other shore billets.

Prior to screening for LCDR, a Supply Officer is required to complete a second operational tour. Again, the majority of these billets will be sea assignments with a few specially designated shore assignments.

Upon selecting for LCDR, a master’s degree becomes an important milestone to a Supply Corps Officer’s career. Most LCDRs and LCDR-selects are sent to NPS to complete one of four master’s degrees in Financial Management (FM), Acquisition and Contract Management (ACM), Supply Chain Management (SCM), or Operations Research – Analysis and Assessment (OR). Of the four degrees, FM and ACM are considered part of the professional Acquisition community. Other Supply Corps Officers receive their master’s degree through civilian universities, either on their own or sponsored by the Navy. 3100s are required to earn a master’s degree in a supply related field, 3105s and 3107s are strongly encouraged to earn a master’s degree, and LDOs are not required to earn a master’s degree.

An SC Officer is not permanently assigned to any of the four career paths – acquisition, supply chain, financial management, and operational logistics, but may develop a wide breadth of experience. For instance, a LCDR may choose to do an acquisition tour, followed by a tour as a Readiness Officer of a ship or major shore command. If selected for CDR, a Supply Corps Officer may serve as a Department Head of an aircraft carrier or as a Commanding Officer of a logistics support unit, possibly followed by another acquisition tour.

**Stove-Piping**

Currently, the Supply Corps emphasizes that individuals have a wide range of experience throughout the Fleet, as opposed to a narrow focus of expertise. “Stove-piping,” as referred to by the Supply Corps, means staying in one community for several tours. For example, a junior Supply Corps Officer could be assigned to a guided-missile destroyer (DDG) for their initial tour after which they could work for a Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) for their next tour, and then go back to sea again as the Supply
Officer of a DDG. This presents a problem for a Supply Corps Officer that chooses a contracting (1306) career path, as DAU requires a minimum of four years of experience as a Contracting Officer to obtain a level III certification.\(^{39}\) This would require two or possibly even three contracting tours for a Supply Corps Officer to achieve and apply.

**Navy Contracting Officers**

The majority of contracts in the Navy are managed by civilian contracting personnel, which comprise over 99% of the contracting force,\(^ {40}\) and Supply Corps Officers that have a subspecialty code designating them as Contracting Officers. SC Contracting Officers are assigned to a variety of commands, including Naval Inventory Control Points (NAVICP), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).

Contracts for shore facilities and support services are managed by the Civil Engineering Corps, through the Public Works Centers (PWC) under Navy Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) at each shore facility.

There are approximately 2500 Supply Corps Officers in the Navy. Of those 2500 Active Duty Supply Corps Officers, there are 126 designated as Contracting Officers (1306). Of those designated as Contracting Officers, several are further designated as 1306S. This means that a Supply Corps Officer completed a Navy Acquisitions and Contracting Officer (NACO) internship, but has not done any additional tours as a contracting officer.

There are 183 Contracting Officer billets throughout the Navy for Supply Corps Officers. Most of these billets are for weapons systems acquisition and fuels management, and not usually for base-level goods and services procurement. This means that Navy Supply Corps Contracting Officers do not receive the contracting experience which would be more directly applicable to the contingency contracting environment.

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\(^{40}\) CAPT Arturo Lopez, NAVSUP Head Quarters Contracting Lead, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA October 25, 2011.
comparison, AF and Army Contracting Officers are involved in managing base-level contracting support; the same kind of support that is needed in a contingency environment.

The AF especially is experienced at managing base-level support contracts, as AF Contracting is a distinct career field with Contracting Officers starting out at the Second Lieutenant level. These Junior AF Officers provide the contracting support for base services, such as dining services, base maintenance, recreation, lodging, mortuary affairs, child development centers, and any other goods or services that military installations need to contract out. The AF has even started contracting out base security to private firms.\footnote{Schriever AFB list of contracts. Retrieved November 24, 2011 from \url{http://www.schriever.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD070925-092.pdf}}

Army contracting is also a distinct officer career field, but Army officers do not become Contracting Officers until they are senior Captains or junior Majors who are branch qualified in their initial Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and request a lateral transfer to the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC). Upon transitioning to the AAC, they receive the requisite DAU training either at the Army Acquisition Basic School or at NPS. The majority of the Army Contracting Officers are assigned to the Army Expeditionary Contracting Command (AECC) where they receive at least one year of base-support experience state-side before they are eligible to deploy as a contingency Contracting Officer.\footnote{Major Amanda Flint, U.S. Army Acquisition Corps, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, November 24, 2011.}

The Navy, unlike the AF and Army, does not have a separate career field for contracting. Contracting is a subspecialty of the Navy Supply Corps. There are two ways in which a Supply Corps Officer can become a Contracting Officer. The first way that a Supply Corps Officer can receive the subspecialty code 1306S is by completing a two-year internship in a contracting command, such as Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). The contracting interns must also complete several DAU courses.
during their internship to meet the 1306S qualification.\textsuperscript{43} There are 29 1306 internships and a Supply Corps Officer may apply for one after their first operational assignment, normally as a Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTjg). This can also be done on an informal basis if a Supply Corps Officer is assigned to a contracting command and receives the required experience and DAU training.

The other way to become a Contracting Officer in the Navy is to attend the 815 acquisition curriculum at NPS. The NPS 815 curriculum gives the Supply Corps Officer a Masters of Business Administration (MBA) degree in government acquisitions and awards them a 1306P subspecialty designator.

Even after receiving a 1306S or P designator, a Supply Corps Officer may not necessarily work in a Contracting Officer billet. A junior Supply Corps Officer, after completing an internship, may be required to do an operational tour in order to meet the requirements for promotion to Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) because 1306 billets are not designated as operational.

A Supply Corps Officer graduating from NPS could potentially never fill a contracting billet, as there are more 1306 designated Supply Corps Officers than there are 1306 billets in the Navy.

**What are the advancement opportunities of a Naval Supply Corps Officer who chooses a contracting career path?**

It is hard to answer this question because the Supply Corps does not keep track of SC Contracting Officer promotion rates. Records are kept on the percentage of SC Officers promoted that belong to the Acquisition Professional Community (APC) which includes not only 1306s, but also 3110 (Financial Management) and 3111 (Financial Manager). Furthermore, the records do not differentiate the level of experience, so a 1306P graduate from NPS who has never done a 1306 tour is still considered part of the APC for purposes of promotion statistics. (see Figure 3)

There is a perception in the SC community that choosing a contracting path is not as competitive as other SC career paths such as Supply Chain Management, Operational Logistics, or Business Financial Management. This negative thinking is due in part to previous SC Chiefs not giving much support to developing a viable contracting path for SC Officers.\(^{44}\) The new SC Chief, however, recognizes the importance of the role of Contracting Officers in supporting the Navy’s Maritime Strategy.\(^{45}\)

According to Captain Scott Bailey, Director of Supply Corps Personnel at Millington, TN, who chose a contracting career, being a SC Contracting Officer is just as competitive promotion-wise as the other SC career paths up to the rank of Captain. Promotion to Flag Officer for a Contracting Officer, however, has not been promising. There are currently 13 SC Flag Officers and four Contracting Officer Flag billets. RADM Kathleen Dussault is the only SC Flag Officer that has any significant contracting experience, and she is not currently filling one of the contracting billets.\(^{46}\)

It remains to be seen if this will change with the new SC Chief’s renewed emphasis on contracting.

\(^{44}\) CAPT Scott Bailey, director, Supply Corps Personnel, Millington, TN, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 23, 2011.


Figure 3. FY2012 SC Captain Selection Statistics\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{47} CAPT Scott Bailey, e-mail attachment to LCDR LaRose, October 15, 2011.
B.  THE CIVIL ENGINEERING CORPS (CEC)

SC is commonly viewed as the only source for contracting in the Navy. However, there is another officer community in the Navy that provides qualified and experienced contracting officers, the Civil Engineering Corps (CEC).

CEC Officers are the Navy’s uniformed professional engineers and architects. They are responsible for executing and managing the planning, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Navy’s shore facilities. They work in construction contract management, facility management, and the Construction Battalions (Seabees).

CEC officers deploy around the world supervising engineering personnel and technicians, and managing contracts and projects.\textsuperscript{48}

**Contract Management**

About 35\% of CEC Officers work in Construction Contract Management. They receive basic contract management training at CEC BQC where they graduate with a level I Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification in contracting, allowing them to be warranted as Junior Officers.

According to the CEC website, “construction contract managers are responsible for their projects from beginning to end. This includes supervision of the initial design, awarding the contract, overseeing the construction, monitoring progress, negotiating changes, and accepting the completed project. Tasks may include resolving design problems, coordinating construction schedules with Navy operations, ensuring that payments correctly reflect progress, and managing the project budget.”\textsuperscript{49}

**Facilities Management**

Facilities Managers, through Public Works, operate and maintain the Navy’s shore facilities. Their responsibilities include: power distribution, heating, air conditioning, water and wastewater, grounds, telecommunications, managing fleets of


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
vehicles and equipment, dealing with environmental issues, and facilities maintenance. They also manage the construction, repair and maintenance of runways, aircraft hangars, piers/wharfs, office buildings, roadways, utility systems, bridges, family housing, and training centers.

**Seabees**

Around 30% of CEC jobs are with the Seabees. CEC Officers provide engineering expertise to the Seabees. Seabees are deployed around the world to perform contingency construction and provide humanitarian relief.

**The CEC Officer**

All Civil Engineer Corps Officers begin their careers with the BQC at Civil Engineer Corps Officers School located in Port Hueneme, California. The Basic Course is 12 weeks long and consists of seven weeks of CEC orientation training, two weeks of specialized training for their first assignment, two weeks of contracting training, and a one week leadership development course. After graduating from BQC, a CEC Officer will serve in either an operational assignment (Seabees) or a shore assignment dealing with contracting or facilities management.

A master’s degree in engineering, financial management or construction/public works management is also required for a CEC Officer. According to the CEC ascensions website, a CEC Officer is expected to earn their master’s degree after they have been in the service for four years but before their eleventh year of service. In addition to obtaining a master’s degree, a CEC Officer must also be licensed as a professional engineer or a registered architect and be level II DAWIA certified in contracting or program management prior to screening for CDR. As a CAPT a CEC Officer is expected to be level III DAWIA certified. (See Figure 4)

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50 Ibid.
C. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JOCS?

A thorough reading of 10 USC 2333 shows that the agency responsible for implementing the requirements is the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy is not specifically tasked to implement any of the requirements listed in section 2333, however, Joint Publication (JP) 4–10, Operational Contract Support, states that “[t]he Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force (under their respective Secretaries) are responsible for planning and executing contracting support to their own forces unless directed otherwise by a [Combatant Commander] (CCDR).”

Furthermore, JP 4–10, Chapter II4.b(1) – (14) lists similar requirements as JOCS, such as providing training for non-acquisition military officers and ensuring jointness through collaboration with other services.

To comply with the Congressional mandate of the 2007 NDAA, which codified OCS into 10 USC, the DoD established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) to synchronize, coordinate, and manage OCS during peacetime and contingency operations.

51 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
1. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO)

In July 2008, the DoD, through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) to oversee contracting during all phases of contingency operations.\(^{55}\) JCASO’s mission is to provide “an enabling capability at the strategic and operational levels to synchronize, coordinate, and manage [Operational Contract Support] OCS across DoD and Whole-of-Government (WoG) during peacetime and contingency operations.”\(^{56}\)

JCASO was created to comply with the requirements of JOCS. JCASO is headed by a senior military officer, Rear Admiral Ron J. MacLaren, with contracting experience and qualification, which meets the first requirement of JOCS. The specific language of section 2333 states that the senior military officer must have “an appropriate level” of program management and contingency contracting experience and qualifications.\(^{57}\) We interpret this to mean that the senior military officer must be level III DAWIA certified in contracting or program management.

According to Admiral MacLaren, as initially envisioned, each service was to assign qualified contracting officers to JCASO who would be readily available to deploy to meet the Combatant Commands’ (COCOM) contracting requirements in a contingency environment. The military services chose not to go with this option for two reasons: 1) the services would lose the billets and funding, and 2) the services still have non-contingency contracting requirements that have to be met on a daily basis, and giving up their contracting officers to JCASO would leave them without the necessary manning.\(^{58}\)

JCASO instead took on an advisory role providing civil service, civilian, and military personnel with professional expertise in contingency planning, contracting, financing, contract law, and civil engineering to CCDRs, upon request, during all phases


\(^{57}\) 10 USC 2333 (b)(1).

\(^{58}\) RDML MacLaren, Director JCASO, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 24, 2011.
of contingency operations. JCASO is staffed with 28 civilian and military personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force (See Figure 5)\(^{59}\)

**Figure 5. JCASO Organizational Chart\(^{60}\)**

Within the organization, JCASO is divided into operations and policy divisions. The operations division is composed of OCS planners and two Mission Support Teams (MST). There are two civilian (GS-14) planners embedded in each COCOM to assist with OCS planning. During peacetime planning, the planners review Operational Plans

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\(^{60}\) Ibid.
(OPLANs), Concept Plans (CONPLANs) and develop Annex Ws to integrate contract support and contractor management plans, initiate requests for joint acquisition boards, and synchronize and coordinate OCS planning with the community of interest (COI).

The two MSTs are assigned to specific CCDR (see Figure 5). The teams, when requested by a CCDR, deploy on short notice to combat theatres of operation to conduct contingency contracting or program management during combat and/or post conflict, reconstruction, or other contingency operations. These teams, it should be noted, do not have the authority to execute contracts.

The policy division of JCASO is responsible for providing contingency acquisition policy, procurement, and contract management expertise during all phases of contingency contracting operations to the CCDRs. They also work with DoD to promote, advance and mature OCS, and recommend OCS process improvement.

See Appendix A, Figures 7, 8 and 9 for JCASO concept of operations.

a. Operation ODYSSEY DAWN – Putting JCASO to the Test

Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) was the most recent contingency operation since JCASO was established. In March 2011, the U.S. took part in an international military operation against Libyan government forces. OOD was the U.S.

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61 An OPLAN is any plan for the conduct of military operations in a hostile environment prepared by the commander of a unified or specified command in response to a requirement established by the JCS.

62 An annex W is the logistics portion of an OPLAN.


64 A COI is an approach for developing the agreements necessary for meaningful information exchange, and doing so collaboratively across the community of people who share a common interest. Retrieved November 2011 from http://dodcio.defense.gov/sites/coi/coi.shtml.htm.

military operation that enforced a no-fly zone and launched air and missile strikes against Libyan forces that were threatening the civilian populations caught in the middle of a civil war.

In the initial phases of the operation, the U.S. had overall tactical and strategical control of the campaign, provided coordination amongst the coalition forces and launched several air and tomahawk missile strikes.

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was given responsibility for the operation and requested JCASO assistance to provide initial planning for possible OCS, based on the assessment of the embedded JCASO planner. JCASO deployed a tailored MST to advise AFRICOM on possible contingency contracting requirements, at the COCOM level, Joint Task Force (JTF) staff level (onboard the USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC/JCC – 20)), and the lead contracting activity, FLC Naples, IT. Even though AFRICOM ended up not needing any contracting support for OOD, JCASO’s response to the COCOM’s request proved JCASO’s value in OCS planning and provided a valuable lessons learned (see Appendix B) for further improvement.66

b. JCASO Recent Engagement with the Navy

On 9 November 2011, JCASO’s Operations and Policy team met with the Navy’s NAVSUP HQ, Logistics Operation Center (LOC), and GLS to initiate OCS engagement from a strategic and operational level, provide a JCASO overview, and establish partnership with the Navy by providing resources on the following topics:

1. Develop the OCS planning capability;
2. Synchronize OCS efforts;
3. Introduce JCASO’s Reserve Component capability; and
4. JCASO’s support from the HQ and at the COCOMs.67

66 Lessons learned memorandum. LCDR Emily Allen, CEC, JCASO Engineering Support Officer. (Appendix B).
67 JCASO memorandum, dated 16 November 2011, on JCASO conference with NAVSUP. (Appendix C).
According to JCASO, the engagement with NAVSUP was a success and generated several follow-on action items to include:

i. JCASO: Takes the lead to coordinate with EUCOM and AFRICOM to outline and initiate the contracting “Council of Colonels”; 68
ii. JCASO: Engage COCOMs and Joint Staff on the Lead Service Component (LSC) Designation;
iii. JCASO: JCASO Planners help to synchronize Navy Component and COCOM Annex Ws;
iv. JCASO: Assist the Navy in developing their Planner’s training plan;
v. Navy: Deconflict the Navy’s internal challenges with the Fleet and the Contracting Activities; and
vi. Navy: participate in the COCOMs’ OCS working groups and the upcoming OCS conference. 69

This meeting shows that the Navy acknowledges its responsibility to JOCS and is actively seeking support in developing its OCS capabilities. It also shows the central role that JCASO is playing in developing and implementing the Navy’s JOCS requirements.

In our opinion, the establishment of JCASO has met some of the requirements of JOCS.

1. Appoint a senior commissioned military officer (Flag Officer) or Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to define, coordinate and implement contingency contracting requirements during all phases of contingency operations. *JCASO has met this requirement.*

2. Appoint a senior commissioned military officers (Flag Officer) or Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of program management and head of contingency contracting during all phases of contingency operations to include stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple United States Government agencies and international organizations. *JCASO has met this requirement.*

3. Identify a cadre of deployable acquisition experts in program management and contingency contracting with the appropriate training and authority to execute contracts in a contingency environment. *This requirement is not JCASO’s responsibility.*

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68 A Council of Colonels is an advisory committee made up of senior military officers at the O-6 level.

69 JCASO memorandum, dated 16 November 2011, on JCASO conference with NAVSUP. (Appendix C).
4. Create DAU training in contingency contracting operations for program management and contingency contracting personnel. *This requirement is not JCASO’s responsibility.*

5. Ensure that program management and contingency contracting personnel receive continuous contingency contracting training even when not deployed in a contingency environment. *This requirement is not JCASO’s responsibility.*

6. Take all steps necessary to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination. *JCASO has met this requirement.*

7. Training of all non-acquisition military personnel who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities, such as oversight of contracts and/or contractors during all phases of contingency operations. *According to RDML MacLaren, JCASO is attempting to get consensus from the CCDRs to realize that OCS is an important and significant factor which brings enhanced capabilities to the Warfighters across all mission areas. JCASO team has made significant progress in the OCS planning and synchronization efforts throughout all J-Codes, with some COCOMs but not all. Each service is still required through their service colleges to educate military officers expected to have oversight of contractors.*

8. Include contractors and contract operations in mission readiness exercises for operations that will require contracting and contractor support. *JCASO is participating in the following annual title X CCDR exercises:*  
   ▪ AFRICOM – Judicious Response;  
   ▪ EUCOM – Austere Challenge;  
   ▪ PACOM – Terminal Fury and Ulchi Freedom Guardian; and  
   ▪ SOUTHCOM – Integrated Advance and Panamax.

Not all exercises are including contingency contracting and contractors. For small scale exercises, the logistics portion is “fairy dusted,” meaning that it is being simulated. Due to time constraints in coordinating the elements of contingency contracting, “fairy dusting” will continue to be used; but we do not feel that this is an issue in meeting the requirements of section 2333.

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70 RDML MacLaren, Director JCASO, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA October 24, 2011.


72 RADM Wolfe, Commander, Navy Expeditionary Support Group, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA November 8, 2011.
JCASO is still a new agency and is meeting with some success. According to Dr. Gansler, this is a “step in the right direction.” Dr. Jaques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 23, 2011. JCASO is still in transition and continues to grow and evolve. We expect that JCASO will continue to improve the joint OCS in the contingency environment as envisioned by JOCS.

2. THE YODER THREE-TIER MODEL – AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In analyzing where the Navy stands in meeting the requirements of JOCS, it is important to have a framework to use as a backdrop of the Navy’s capabilities and efforts. The Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM) is a model proposed by CDR (Ret) E. Cory Yoder, an NPS senior lecturer and retired Naval Supply Corps Contracting Officer, to improve the planning, coordination and integration of contracting operations in a contingency environment. Commander Yoder created his model after his experience as an advisor and planner on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Forces staff and the challenges he encountered in 1998 during Operation EAGLE EYE following the Kosovo War.

We feel that the YTTM for contingency contracting represents the best framework for managing joint contingency contracting, to include the training of Navy Contracting Officers.

As envisioned in the YTTM, there are three levels of complexity in a contingency environment that call for three different levels of experience and knowledge (see Figure 6).

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73 Dr. Jaques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 23, 2011.


Tier I

The first tier of the YTMM is the Ordering Officer. The Ordering Officer is the basic contracting officer who writes and executes contracts at the base-level for the goods and services that the tactical command might require. This would include services such as food services, grounds maintenance, and cleaning services, as well as general commercial goods such as back-up generators and construction supplies.

Because Tier 1 contracting is basic contracting, it would only require a junior officer with a level I or II DAWIA certification in contracting.

Tier II

The second tier of the YTMM is the Leveraging Officer. The Leveraging Officer serves an important function as they will be expected to liaison with local businesses in the contingency environment to help broker support contracts for the local commanders.

General David Petraeus, as the former Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq, sought a greater role for contingency contracting in Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations as he believed that by providing support contracts to local businesses the U.S. would be able to provide economic stability to an insurgent region and help win the “hearts and minds” campaign.76

Because the Leveraging Officer is someone who will be working with local businesses and leaders, they need to be at least a field grade officer (O-4/O-5) with negotiating experience and at least a level II DAWIA certification in contracting. A field grade officer is perceived to have more credibility than a junior officer, which is important to local business and government leaders.

Tier III

Tier III of the YTMM is the Integrated Planner and Executer (IPE). The IPE is a senior contracting officer (O-5/O-6) that is level III DAWIA certified in contracting or

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program management who works with the CCDRs to develop OPLANs that integrate contingency contracting. The IPE needs to be assigned to a CCDR not just during contingency operations, but during peacetime as well. This ensures that contracting support will be ready for the CCDR from the very start of a contingency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Tier Level &amp; Model Title</th>
<th>Functions/Education/Rank</th>
<th>Highlights and Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordering Officer—Tier One</td>
<td>- basic ordering&lt;br&gt;- some simplified acquisitions&lt;br&gt;- training: DAU CON 234&lt;br&gt;- DAWIA Certified CON Level I or II&lt;br&gt;- junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 series civilians</td>
<td>- simple buys&lt;br&gt;- little integration&lt;br&gt;- no operational planning&lt;br&gt;- no broad liaison functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveraging Contracting Officer—Tier Two</td>
<td>- leverages to local economy&lt;br&gt;- reduces “pushed” material support&lt;br&gt;- training/education: DAU CON 234, recommended higher education&lt;br&gt;- DAWIA Certified CON Level II or III&lt;br&gt;- senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 series civilians</td>
<td>- better local operational planning&lt;br&gt;- some integration&lt;br&gt;- more capability for the operational commander&lt;br&gt;- no planned theater integration&lt;br&gt;- no broad liaison functions&lt;br&gt;- may perform to optimize local operations at the detriment to theater ops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)—Tier Three</td>
<td>- highest level of planning and integration—joint&lt;br&gt;- linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5&lt;br&gt;- creates and executes OPLAN CCO strategy&lt;br&gt;- provides direction to tier two and one&lt;br&gt;- links operations strategically to theater objectives of COCOM&lt;br&gt;- education: Master’s degree or higher and, JPME Phase I and II&lt;br&gt;- DAWIA Certified CON Level III, and other DAWIA disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc)&lt;br&gt;- senior officers (0-6+), senior civilians, GS-13+ or SES</td>
<td>- performs operational and theater analysis, integrates results into OPLAN&lt;br&gt;- link between COCOM and OPLAN to all theater contracting operations&lt;br&gt;- coordinates theater objectives with best approach to contracted support&lt;br&gt;- can achieve broader national security goals through effective distribution of national assets&lt;br&gt;- includes planning, communication, coordination, and exercising with NGO and PVO in theater</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations
Summary of YTTM

In a combat contingency environment, AF contracting, and to a lesser extent Army contracting, integrates smoothly into the YTTM because their contracting is a separate and well-developed career path. AF Contracting Officers start as junior officers providing BOS contracting which is similar to the tier one contracting of the YTTM. As they progress in their careers, they receive the necessary training and experience to perform tier two and three functions. Although the Army Contracting Officers do not become Contracting Officers until they become Majors, they still receive BOS contracting experience before being deployed to a contingency environment. Additionally, like the AF, they have an established training curriculum that provides progressive career development to levels two and three of the YTTM.

The Navy does not fit into the YTTM as easily as the other two services, but can still utilize the YTTM, nonetheless. Contracting is not a separate career for Naval Officers, but is handled by both CEC and SC Officers. At the junior officer level, CEC Officers are qualified level I DAWIA in contracting upon graduation from CEC BQC and several work with BOS contracts.\(^77\) This enables a CEC junior officer to assume the responsibilities of a tier one Ordering Officer in the YTTM.

CEC Officers will fit into both level two and three of the YTTM because they are required to be DAWIA level II certified in contracting as a LCDR, and level III certified as a CDR\(^78\). CEC Contracting Officers have rarely, if ever, been used as Contracting Officers in a contingency environment because their engineering expertise is more critical than their contracting expertise at these levels.

SC junior officers do receive basic contracting education in Supply Corps BQC, but not enough to receive a DAWIA certification. Furthermore, upon graduation from BQC, SC Officers are immediately sent to operational commands with no contracting responsibilities. This means that a junior SC Officer is not qualified to perform the duties


\(^78\) Ibid.
of an Ordering Officer in the first tier of the YTTM. There are a small number of junior SC officers, however, that are level II DAWIA certified in contracting through the NACO internship who can perform as level I Ordering Officers. But due to their rank, they would not be able to perform as a tier two Leveraging Officer.

As a LCDR, a SC officer can become a Contracting Officer by receiving an MBA degree in Acquisition and Contract Management, which gives them the training requirements but not the experience for the level II DAWIA certification in contracting. This qualifies them to be a Leveraging Officer, but they lack the recommended experience of the YTTM. Serving in a contracting command after receiving their degree will give them the experience needed to be a successful Leveraging Officer in the YTTM.

With four years of cumulative contracting experience, a SC Contracting Officer is eligible to receive a level III DAWIA certification in contracting and become an IPE.

In summary, we feel that by pooling both the CEC and SC Contracting Officers together the Navy is able to fit into all three levels of the YTTM.
IV. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS WITH DOD ACQUISITION POLICY MANAGERS

As part of our research, we conducted several interviews with DoD acquisition policy planners and decision makers. Below is our summary of the key interviews pertaining to the Navy’s implementation of JOCS.

The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler

Dr. Gansler is the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. He led the Army’s independent commission in 2007 to review and recommend improvements to the Army’s policy and procedures in conducting acquisition and program management in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commission’s report, “Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,” became known as the Gansler Report, and was the catalyst to the Congressional action that added section 2333 to 10 USC.

- Contractors are not doing inherently-governmental work, but are providing support that are inherently-governmental. Need to differentiate between inherently- and non-inherently governmental.
- AF was planning to in-source aircraft maintenance work; claiming that it would save up to 40% on costs. But a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report shows that it is 90% more expensive to do the aircraft maintenance in-house, and wrench-turning is not inherently-governmental.
- Oct 2005 CBO, “Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces,” and GAO March 2010 report on personal security services in Baghdad show that contractors are 90% cheaper, better trained, and can be hired (when needed) and let go (when needed) easier than government workers.
- Security services are not inherently-governmental if they are only standing guard duty.
• March 2010 GAO report stated that it would cost $858M/year to pay for security services for the embassy in Baghdad using State Department employees, but contracting private security services for the embassy would cost only $78M/year.

• CRS Dec 2009 background analysis on DoD contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan states that private contractors are cheaper and better trained, and have a more rapid response by being able to hire and fire as needed.

• Current phase 0 planning and exercises have not been including contractors; yet in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are approximately 100,000 uniformed military personnel and 175,000 private contractor personnel. Army has recently started to include contractors in training exercises. Need to figure out who a contractor will report to, and who can and cannot issue commands to a private contractor. Need to involve key contractor personnel, such as maintenance and logistics, so that any problem areas can be worked out before an actual contingency.

• Army has established the Army Contracting Command which includes contingency contracting, and has created General Officer billets for Army contracting. The Navy should follow the Army structure.

• Majority of contingency contracts are for services, not goods. Most training is for contracting for goods, but contracting for services is very different than contracting for goods. We need better policies, procedures, and laws to address contracting of services. Contracting for an engineer is different than contracting to buy a tank. 57% of all contracting goes to services and this is probably higher in a contingency environment.

• Service contracts are harder to measure performance and can lead to fraud, waste and abuse. Measuring performance requires more manpower and DCMA needs to be more involved. Acquisition workforce has seen a steep reduction in manning while volume of contracts has dramatically increased (e.g. DCMA went from 25,000 personnel to 10,000 while volume of contracts, and dollar values, has dramatically increased).
• There is a lack of experienced contracting personnel. It will take up to 15 years for current contracting interns to become proficient. The government seriously undervalued the importance of contracting in a contingency environment.

• The AF is the only service with Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) working in the contracting field and receiving contracting experience.

• There are three kinds of contracting: 1) major weapon systems; 2) base-level, station, and command-level systems; and 3) services. There should be education, training, and a career path for all three contracting fields.

• The government has done a poor job in compensating civilian government contracting employees that have volunteered to deploy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  o They are not receiving long-term medical benefits;
  o Their life insurance is not being changed to allow for acts of war; and
  o They are not being fairly compensated for the extra hours that they are working in the war zones because their salary is limited by Congress.

• Government civilian contracting officers are being dissuaded from volunteering by their agencies because the agencies are not receiving replacements for them.
  o DoD tried to address these issues, but [Office of Management and Budget] OMB rejected any changes due to increased costs.

• Dr. Gansler completed a study of the single-buying agency concept that is being used by several European countries (such as France and Sweden), but there is no evidence that it works better. It is important to have a linkage between the users and buyers to better understand what the users’ requirements are.

• The Army has been periodically updating Dr. Gansler’s Commission regarding their progress in implementing the requirements of JOCS because they are the ones that commissioned the study. The Navy, however, has not provided any updates to Dr. Gansler’s Commission.
• The Navy is not excluded from the requirements of JOCS. The Navy needs to determine what portions are applicable to the Navy.

• In looking at the Army’s educational system for senior officers, it does not include the importance of contracting and contractors; yet more than 50% of their force is comprised of contractors. Military leadership should understand the implications of the requirements that they place upon contracts.

• [Contracting Officer Representative] CORs are one of the most critical functions. DAU is saying that they are putting more emphasis on COR training, but Dr. Gansler has not seen any updates to COR training by DAU. CORs should be pre-selected and used during training exercises. A COR should be someone who understands the substance of the services being contracted (e.g. someone who has food management experience should be selected as a COR to oversee a food service contract).

• The majority of senior Navy officers getting promoted to the acquisition commands were officers coming from sea duty. The Packard Commission found that Army Material Command had five General officers in a row that had no acquisition background. Goldwater-Nichols Law required that all acquisition commands be headed by an officer with acquisition background. Dr. Gansler’s impression is that the Navy is not following this guidance. Downgrading acquisition Admiral billets or changing them to civilian billets sends the message that acquisition is not important. It is up to the Secretary of each military service to ensure that these laws are being enforced.

• It is important that the military services’ cultures recognize the importance of acquisition.

• Soldiers will not go back to peeling potatoes like they did during WW I and II. Peeling potatoes is not an inherently-governmental function. There will always be a need for contractors; and in the future, there will be a need for even more contractors than what we have now. Contactors are potato peelers and not mercenaries. Warfighting is inherently-governmental and that is not what we are hiring contractors to do.
• Government should not give up responsibility to manage contractors. There is a perception by the public that all responsibility is being turned over to the contractors without governmental oversight. The Press seems to think that ‘fraud waste and abuse’ is just one word, but there is a distinction between fraud and waste. Hiring soldiers to cook is waste.

• There have been more contractors killed than military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no front line of battle (war among the people) and soldiers and contractors are intermixed.

RDML Ron J. MacLaren

Rear Admiral MacLaren is the director of the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), which is part of the Defense Logistics Agency. JCASO was established to orchestrate, synchronize and integrate program management of contingency acquisition across combatant commands and U.S. Government agencies during pre-conflict operations, contingency operations and combat operations.

• JCASO was fully operational in 2010 and works for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) program support to help meet the requirements of JOCS.

• JCASO is located at DLA HQ and is staffed by 38 personnel.

• In response to the Gansler Report and JOCS, the Army has added back five General Officer contracting billets.

• The Navy is not exempt from the requirements of JOCS. Navy CEC has Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts⁷⁹ (a type of contract that provides for an indefinite quantity of supplies or services during a fixed period of time) globally to support contingency contracting.

• Expeditionary contracting and contingency contracting are the same except that contingencies are declared by either the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense, per 10 USC 101. Declared contingencies provide

⁷⁹ Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.501(a).
special FAR exemptions, and increases the thresholds of the dollar values that a contracting officer may use for SAP.

- AFRICOM requested an MST for Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.
- JCASO is providing support at the strategic level for the COCOMs in contingency environments. From the strategic theatre level, JCASO provides support to the tactical/operational level as needed.
- JCASO has two planners (GS-14) assigned to each COCOM for phase 0 planning support.
- Each military service is still responsible for their own contracting doctrine until a joint area is declared.
- Over 50% of the force in the recent operations has been contractors, which led to a loss of situational awareness by the combat commanders in the field.
- SPOT (Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker) is supposed to account for all contingency personnel, but is not working as it should. It is cumbersome and still being refined.
- The battlefield commanders need a common operating picture of the battle space, to include all contracting entities in the Joint Operating Area (JOA) which should report to one tactical commander.
- There are too many contracting entities with no visibility of spend or synchronization, such as:
  - Army sustainment command uses the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), which utilizes prime vendor contracts;
  - Army Corps of Engineers use prime contractors;
  - Army Rock Island reach-back contracting; and
  - DLA reach-back contracting.
- Contract administration continues to be an issue. CORs are still a problem area. The COR is still being identified as a collateral duty.
- Battlefield commanders don’t have visibility on spend, which hampers their efforts to incorporate contingency contracting into their COIN strategy.
• The Army doesn’t have authority over all contracting entities in the JOA, which leads to a lack of synchronization amongst DoD and other government agencies, and:
  o Loss of economies of scale (EOS);
  o Redundancy; and
  o Fraud, waste and abuse.
• There should be one line of authority for coordination of all contracting entities in a JOA, which should be the Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command (JTSCC).
• JCASO is not providing the training of non-acquisition workforce because the service schools (staff colleges) are supposed to implement contracting education for all non-acquisition officers.
  o U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has created its own training of non-contracting personnel for commanders coming into theatre.
• JCASO does not have a role in educating the COCOMs on contracting requirements, but does provide training information as requested.
• JCASO is exploring the possibility of using each military services’ established contracts, such as the Army using Navy husbanding contracts.
• A whole-of-government contracting approach is needed in contingency contracting. During Haiti, DoD was planning to ship tents from Europe while USAID had tents in Miami warehouses.
• Task Force 2010 – ensuring that we are contracting with the right contractors that are not funneling money to enemies or criminal fronts.
• There are economic implications of contingency contracting when we spend money in a foreign economy. Purchasing from a local supplier in a third-world country can drive up costs by creating scarcity of material. Contracting Officers are not trained to understand second and third order consequences of buying from local suppliers in a contingency environment, nor is it their mission.
• Our government accounting system penalizes customers for buying locally. This creates an incentive for local commanders to order goods from the U.S. because the customer doesn’t pay for transportation costs from the U.S., but will pay for local transportation costs.
  o Implement a local transportation network, based on the EUCOM model, which uses Defense Transportation System-like accounting that will not penalize an end-user for buying local.
• JCASO’s job is to identify all of the moving pieces and bring all of the players involved in contingency contracting together.
• U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is working with JCASO to improve their unique expeditionary contracting capabilities.
• COCOMs do not have their own forces so they have to send out a Request For Forces (RFF) to support contingency operations, including contracting officers.
• JCASO has met the intent of JOCS, but the work is ongoing.
• JCASO is engaging all of the COCOMs, especially CENTCOM.
  o Working with CENTCOM to establish contingency contracting policies to support their COIN strategy.
• JCASO has no contracting authority, but has the nucleus to stand up a contracting command. JCASO would need to receive contracting authority from the lead service in theatre, and/or the DLA charter would have to be revised to give JCASO general contracting authority.
• JCASO has two MSTs that are headed by DAWIA level III Navy CDR and AF Colonel.
• The JCASO civilian workforce has former civilian contracting officers and are all deployable.
• JCASO is developing a template RFF for a COCOM to stand up a JTSCC.
• The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) exists, but is weak and not well-defined. Need to build a pool of eligible civilian contractors and then educate the military services on how to properly utilize them.

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• JCASO planners write the annex Ws for the COCOMs. They take into consideration all J-codes within a COCOM, as contingency contracting requirements come from all J-codes.

RADM Patricia E. Wolfe

Rear Admiral Wolfe is the Commander of the Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, and was deployed as Commander, Task Force Forty-Eight, Joint Logistics Hub at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE for Haiti earthquake relief efforts in 2010.

• Haiti was a unique contingency contracting situation as there was nothing available in Haiti to purchase.
• Most of the contingency contracting for Haiti was done in the Dominican Republic through U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) because most of the contracting was for transportation services.
• Utilization of SC reservists for contingency contracting has been limited due to warranting issues.
• There are dedicated reserve units for contingency contracting and some are activated in Afghanistan right now.
• Haiti was not a joint operation for the first three weeks, and each service was supporting their own forces.
• Contingency contracting is being incorporated in large scale exercises because troops have to be fed and bed down. “Fairy dusting” logistics (simulating logistics support) in small scale exercises.
• It is hard to train a reservist in contingency contracting because it takes several years to become DAWIA level III certified.
• Civilian contracting officers that are enlisted can’t be used as a warranted contracting officers when called up because of Navy policy.
• Navy needs contingency contracting for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR).
Captain Scott W. Bailey

Captain Bailey is the Director of Supply Corps Personnel at Millington, TN and is responsible for managing the detailing process of SC Officers.

- Converting the billet of the Executive Director, Acquisition and Logistics Management Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from a military to a civilian position will help institutionalize contracting in the Supply Corps. [This was done with the appointment of Mr. Elliot Branch to the current position.]
- Two-thirds of all SC 1306s are 1306-lite, meaning they are 1306P instead of a 1306Q. 1306P-qualified SC Officers have contracting training but do not have contracting experience.
- Long term, the SC will not become contingency contracting experts, but our contracting training is sufficient to do contingency contracting as required.
- Most contingency contracting is not necessarily base support. Construction contracts are definitely CEC responsibilities, but most other contingency contracting issues are a good match for SC skill sets.
- Historically, contracting was a very viable career path. In the recent past, contracting was not as valued by the SC but remained as a viable career path for SC officers all the way to Captain, but not necessarily to flag level. RADM Heinrich, the new Chief of SC, has begun a course correction to reinvigorate the contracting career path and coupled with the newly-reorganized Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisitions and Procurement (DASN AP), is moving SC contracting back to mainstream viability.
  - 3 out of 4 contracting flag officer billets are being staffed by non-1306 or 1306-lite SC Flag Officers.
- DAU schooling for contingency contracting does meet the training requirements of 2333.
- “If you can handle contracting at an FLC than you can handle contracting in a contingency environment.”
V. FINDINGS

What is the current state of the Navy’s implementation of JOCS?

The Navy has implemented the minimum requirements of JOCS, with the exception of subsection (e) that requires the training of non-acquisition officers. Our research has shown the following results in connection with the requirements of JOCS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOCS Requirement</th>
<th>Fully Met</th>
<th>Part Met</th>
<th>Not Met</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appoint a senior commissioned military officer (Flag Officer) or Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to define, coordinate and implement contingency contracting requirements during all phases of contingency operations.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Secretary of Defense’s establishment of JCASO has met this requirement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Appoint a senior commissioned military officers (Flag Officer) or Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of program management and head of contingency contracting during all phases of contingency operations to include stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple United States Government agencies and international organizations. | X         |          |         | JCASO satisfies this requirement (refer to Appendix A for JCASO phased contingency support plan). Annual Multinational Joint exercises that JCASO participates in include:  
  - AFRICOM – Judicious Response  
  - EUCOM – Austere Challenge  
  - PACOM – Terminal Fury and Ulchi Freedom Guardian  
  - SOUTHCOM – Integrated Advance and Panamax |
| Identify a cadre of deployable acquisition experts in program management and contingency contracting with the appropriate training and authority to execute contracts | X         |          |         | The Navy has met this requirement. PERS-4412 maintains a list of all 1306 SC officers. All CEC officers from O-1 to O-3 are level I DAWIA certified, O-4 and O-5 are level II |
in a contingency environment. | DAWIA certified and all O-6 are level III DAWIA certified.
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Create DAU training in contingency contracting operations for program management and contingency contracting personnel. | X | DAU has created contingency contracting training to include CON234 (Contingency Contracting) and CON 334 (Advanced Contingency Contracting) taught at NPS and online. DAU also provides online predeployment training for CORs.
Ensure that program management and contingency contracting personnel receive continuous contingency contracting training even when not deployed in a contingency environment. | X | Our research has not uncovered any evidence to suggest that the Navy is addressing this requirement.
Take all steps necessary to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination. | X | JCASO fulfills this requirement for all services.
Training of all non-acquisition military personnel who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities, such as oversight of contracts and/or contractors during all phases of contingency operations. | X | Our research has not uncovered any evidence to suggest that the Navy is addressing this requirement. Requests for data from the Naval War College and Navy Executive Development Program went unanswered.
Include contractors and contract operations in mission readiness exercises for operations that will require contracting and contractor support. | X | Our interviews show that contractors are being incorporated in large-scale exercises, but not in all small-scale exercises.

Table 1. JOCS Status of Implementation

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80 The Navy Executive Development Program is a training program for newly selected Flag Officers and SES.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on our analysis, we have come up with the following nine recommendations:

1. The Navy needs to ensure better coordination between the CEC and the SC.

   The Navy is unique in that contracting is divided between CEC and SC. CEC is tasked with providing contracting for construction, engineering and short-term facilities support. SC is tasked with providing contracting support to provide goods and services to the Fleet. In a contingency environment, there is a need for both types of contracting support, but CEC is often overlooked. The Navy should have a contingency plan that integrates both CEC and SC contracting support.

2. Promote only contracting officers to the flag billets designated as contracting commands.

   Dr. Gansler stated that the military services need to promote Contracting Officers to Flag to show that contracting is important. Additionally, having a Flag Contracting Officer will provide the contracting community with someone to provide leadership and direction. Flag Officers are called upon to set policy and it is imperative that the person setting contracting policy has a deep understanding of contracting issues and regulations that can only be gained through years of experience. In addition, the SC should ensure that there is a relevant career path to create contracting Flag Officers with enough experience to support executive contracting positions.

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81 Dr. Jaques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA, October 23, 2011.
3. **Increase Contracting Officer manning at FLCs to be able to provide contingency contracting support service and designate at least one Contracting Officer at each FLC as a contingency contracting officer who will also participate in any exercises for the FLC region.**

The main reason given for why the FLCs have not provided contingency contracting support is that they do not have the manning. Currently, there is only one Contracting Officer assigned to each FLC. If that contracting officer was to be pulled away to provide support for a contingency there would not be anyone to provide contracting service to the Fleet, which is the FLC’s primary mission.

4. **Recruit private industry contracting professionals into the Navy Officer Reserves.**

Rear Admiral Sean Crean, Deputy Commander Naval Supply Systems Command, proposed recruiting contracting professionals from private industry to the SC Reserves. This would provide a ready pool of experienced and educated contracting officers for contingency operations. Along with recruiting Contracting Officers from private industry, Admiral Crean suggested creating a Reserve Contracting Command where Reserve Contracting Officers would be able to receive contingency contracting training on an ongoing basis as part of their annual reserve training.\(^\text{82}\)

5. **Incentivize government civil service 1102s to become part of deployment pool.**

Captain Lopez stated that 99% of all Navy contracting is handled by government civil service employees (1102) that could be called upon to support a contingency operation.\(^\text{83}\) By law, 1102s cannot be ordered to deploy and the Navy can only rely on volunteers. However, past attempts by the Navy to solicit civilian volunteers have not been successful.

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\(^{82}\) RDML Sean Crean, Deputy Commander Naval Supply Systems Command, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA November 10, 2011.

\(^{83}\) CAPT Arturo Lopez, NAVSUP HQ, Contracting Lead, in discussion with LCDR Garcia and LCDR LaRose, Monterey, CA October 23, 2011.
According to Dr. Gansler, the government has done a poor job in compensating civilian government contracting employees that have volunteered to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan:

- They are not receiving long-term medical benefits;
- Their life insurance is not being changed to allow for acts of war; and
- They are not being fairly compensated for the extra hours that they are working in the war zones because their salary is limited by Congress.

Government civilian contracting officers are also being dissuaded from volunteering by their agencies because the agencies are not receiving replacements for them. The military tried to address these issues, but OMB rejected any changes due to increased costs.

The military needs to address these concerns with Congress, showing that the increased costs of deploying experienced civilian 1102s would save more money through better contract administration and decreased fraud, waste and abuse.

6. Provide JCASO contracting authority.

Currently, JCASO has no contracting authority. Because JCASO has both experienced civilian and military Contracting Officers that are ready to deploy within 48 hours anywhere around the world, they are in the best position to provide a rapid contracting response.

There are two ways that JCASO could receive contracting authority:

- DLA could provide a warrant, but this would be limited to only the goods and services that DLA is authorized to procure in accordance with their charter; or
- The Head of Contracting Activity/Authority (HCA) of the service components may provide warrant authority.

A DLA warrant would be limiting for a Contracting Officer in a contingency environment because of the wide range of goods and services that would be needed to support the operation.
Each HCA should provide the Contracting Officers in the MSTs a conditional warrant that can be used for OCS.

7. **Have all military services provide a list of all qualified deployable Contracting Officers (military and civilian) to JCASO.**

   JCASO does not currently have a database of qualified contracting officers that it can access when needed. We recommend that all military services provide a list of all qualified contracting officers that are deployable on a quarterly basis to JCASO.

8. **Have the Naval War College provide a robust contingency contracting training course to all non-acquisition military officers.**

   There is currently no training provided in contingency contracting as part of the professional military education curriculum. We recommend that further research be conducted on ways to incorporate contingency contracting training for non-acquisition military officers into the Naval War College curriculum.

9. **Clarify DoD expectations of the Navy.**

   The statute, as written, is vague and has led to disagreement amongst senior officers in the Navy with regards to the Navy’s contingency contracting responsibilities. DoD needs to provide the Navy with clear direction on what is expected during the various phases of OCS.

**B. CONCLUSION**

To summarize, the Navy’s implementation has been mixed. Five of the eight JOCS requirements have been fully met. One requirement has been partially met and two still need significant attention.

NAVSUP, in coordination with JCASO, is moving forward in developing its OCS capabilities. There is still a need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of NAVSUP and NAVFAC in responding to contingency contracting requirements.

The Navy needs to ensure that program management and contingency contracting personnel receive continuous contingency contracting training even when not deployed.
Furthermore, the Navy needs to create a training program for all non-acquisition military personnel who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities.

We feel that the establishment of JCASO has been the most significant response to JOCS, and NAVSUP’s collaboration with JCASO is the right way forward in meeting the Navy’s JOCS responsibilities.
APPENDIX A.  JCASO CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Figure 7.  JCASO Planning Phase

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Support Phase

Figure 8. JCASO Support Phase\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
Transition Phase

Contingency Operation

Requesting Combatant Commander

JCASO Forward is relieved by a JTSCC or when an operation concludes and there is no further requirement.

Relieved by a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command

JCASO Forward

- Will help define and develop the operational and organizational framework and assist in drafting the JMD / RFF
- Hands over contingency acquisition management and oversight to the new organization and provides it with initial policy, procedures, and leadership
- Assists the JTSCC in acquiring OCS situational awareness, conducts turnover and re-deploys to garrison

Reach-Back Capability

- Once a JTSCC is formed, the coordination performed by JCASO Forward will be conducted within the JTSCC with reach back capability to the JCASO organization

Figure 9. JCASO Transition Phase\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
APPENDIX B.  OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN LESSONS LEARNED

Submitter Name:  LCDR Emily Allen/JCASO

COCOM:  AFRICOM

Event Description:
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN

OBSERVATION - 1:
Lack of logistics coordination to prepare JCASO deploying personnel to provide OCS support.

DISCUSSION:
When the JTF is embarked onboard a Navy vessel, the deployment process and requirements are very different than a land based operation: i.e. DTS orders with “variation authorized” is not sufficient; situational awareness of the living conditions need to be identified; specific training requirement to board the ship; and the limitation of berthing availability, especially for females.

Upon the JCASO personnel’s arrival to NAVAF/C6F in Naples, IT, it was identified that the security requirement received were for boarding USS MOUNT WHITNEY only. Additional JPAS requests were required for NAVAF/C6F which was not identified initially. This created some challenges in accessing the required facilities.

Although initial coordination was provided by the COCOM to forward deploy JCASO personnel to the JTF, additional requirements and information were discovered upon arrival to Naples which were essential to properly prepare the forward deployed personnel; including identification of specific RSOI POCs, additional training requirements, orders required, acceptable uniforms, and items required to board the ship.
Once the ship was ready to accept the JCASO personnel, NAVAF/C6F RSOI Team did not provide additional coordination, such as the actual location of the ship, transportation, or security brief to a new location in a foreign country (DLA requires foreign travel brief for all personnel travel to a new foreign country or city).

DLA Troop Support Europe and Africa and DLA Europe and Africa at Naples, IT, provided superb (above and beyond) coordination support for JCASO forward deployed personnel: provided office space to work in, home base of operation, transportation to the ship without additional cost, and safely arrival to the ship in a remote location (commercial flight and taxi would NOT get the JCASO personnel onboard the ship in a timely or in a safe manner).

**RECOMMENDATION:**
Recommend COCOM provide coordination with the JTF RSOI team for JCASO to be included in their standard distribution list.

**IMPLICATIONS:**
This will enable the DLA JLOC and JCASO Main to better prepare the forward deploying personnel with administrative and logistics requirements.

**OBSERVATION - 2:**
The confusion between the RFF for JCASO support and the JMD billet requirement for DLA and JCASO created a challenge with the supported commands and activities complicating their ability to understand JCASO’s roles and responsibilities during the contingency operation.

**DISCUSSION:**
RFF was submitted prior to the identification and submission of the JMD. RFF was submitted for two (2) JCASO Planners to support the JTF commander: (1) to JTF
onboard USS Mount Whitney and (1) to FISC Naples. The RFF did not identify the JMD requirement.

The JMD had two (2) DLA requirements to fill: (1) DLA LNO and (1) Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO).

This created a misunderstanding from DLA JLOC as to how many billets or personnel are being requested from DLA.

Even with O-6 level coordination with all of the principle decision makers at the COCOM and JTF level, the mis-titled JMD billet created misunderstandings of JCASO’s roles and responsibilities.

JCASO does not provide CCOs and does not have the authority/warrant to issue contracts. In short, JCASO’s role should not fill or replace the CCO billet requirement.

In this case, the OCS role effectively replaced the JMD requirement for a CCO, provided OCS coordination and synchronization among the service components, JTF Staff and the COCOM. However, the JTF Staff did not receive adequate contract support for common use logistics from its supported contracting activities, i.e. the supply office onboard USS MOUNT WHITNEY.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Recommend the RFF identify ‘capabilities’ rather than individuals for a contingency.

Clearly specify the skill sets that are being requested. If the RFF is used to fulfill a JMD requirement, the JMD billet should be identified in the RFF.

JCASO needs to finalize and distribute the JCASO CONOPS.

Continue to educate the service components on JCASO’s roles and responsibilities by participating in the COCOM’s exercises.
**IMPLICATIONS:**

As the RFF requested two people, rather than an OCS capability, another RFF would have been required had the operation ramped up and additional support required.

Consistency of the skill sets and billet requirements would avoid misunderstanding and duplication.

Finalizing and issuing the JCASO CONOPS would eliminate misunderstandings of what JCASO actually is and the required deployment timeline.

**OBSERVATION - 3:**

There was some confusion within the JTF J4 concerning where to organizationally place JCASO’s OCS capability on the JTF Staff to maximize its enabling capabilities.

**DISCUSSION:**

OCS involves planning and execution of both current and future ops. It is more than just logistics contract support but includes any and all contract support, such as engineering, security and others.

During JTF-OD, the JCASO rep was initially assigned within the J4 to the Distribution Cell, then to the Sustainment and Service Cell (current ops). Coordination with Planning (Annex W), Engineering, USAID LNO and others were required (as expected).

JCASO provided inputs on OCS requirements to the JTF J4 OPT; also, coordinated inputs to the OCS CONOPS, on behalf of the JTF J4, to AFRICOM.
**RECOMMENDATION:**

Continue to educate the service components on OCS concepts and doctrines and how JCASO can contribute to the overall mission by participating in COCOM exercises and current operations.

Recommend JCASO Forward Team report directly to the JTF J4.

**IMPLICATIONS:**

Understanding the OCS concepts and doctrine by the service components will enhance OCS planning and execution.

Proper placement of OCS capability would better enable coordination and synchronization on all OCS matters across the JTF J4 staff and among the components (as directed).

**OBSERVATION - 4:**

JCASO’s role in OCS in support of JTF Lead was valued.

**DISCUSSION:**

JCASO’s principal OCS synchronization role was highly valued. Had the operation developed into one requiring a complex component and HQ synchronization, JCASO (as part of the JTF) was the only capability in place to perform this ‘coordination cell’ function.

JCASO was heavily relied upon to synchronize and coordinate OCS operations for OOD. The Navy was incapable and unwilling to take on the OCS/contracting coordination role without additional resources and OCS training.

Due to the lack of manpower and resources within the AOR, the majority of the JTF Staff are dual-hatted or triple-hatted to carry on JFMCC, NAVAF, and/or C6F duties.
and responsibilities. When coupled with the refusal of FISC Naples to lead the contract coordination cell, the remainder of the JCASO Fwd Team would have been needed (and possibly others) had the operation developed into one requiring complex component and HQ synchronization. This demand signal clearly validates the primary JCASO model of a deployable, OCS team charged with synchronization of OCS across the JOA (at least as it pertains to AFRICOM).

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Recommend maintaining the capability within JCASO to deploy a unified OCS team.

**IMPLICATIONS:**

It is mission essential to have an OCS enabler to ensure OCS is synchronized with the Commander’s intent across multiple COCOMs and help to maximize efficiencies, minimize costs, enhance support, and reduce competition for limited resources.

**OBSERVATION - 5:**

The means to communicate with the service component contracting activities was inconsistent.

**DISCUSSION:**

SIPR access was not always readily available at the contracting activities. Most of these activities were required to go to a separate location from their work spaces to access their SIPR accounts. Some even had to go to a different facility or a different installation to access their SIPR accounts.

COCOMs and JTFs have easy access to SIPR and NIPR. Many unclassified information gathering efforts and discussions are being conducted on the SIPR side. This
created a challenge for some of the component contracting activities to access the required tasks or requests in a timely manner.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Recommend minimizing the unclassified discussion over the SIPR to get timely feedbacks.

If a task or discussion is required on the SIPR, a courtesy e-mail should be sent out on the NIPR side.

**IMPLICATIONS:**

Courtesy e-mails on NIPR would avoid any unnecessary delays in the tasks responses.

**OBSERVATION - 6:**

AFRICOM OOD OCS CONOPS Development.

**DISCUSSION:**

Joint Staff tasked the COCOM with producing an OCS CONOPS in response to the EXORD.

An AFRICOM OOD OCS CONOPS was deemed necessary to identify and gain component approval on how contract support would be provided. AFRICOM Standard Plan Annex W was utilized as the basis for development of the CONOPS. Review of the Operation OOD JCS EXORD led to the decision to use service support to own component during initial operational phases. If more complex operations had developed, a lead service would likely have been designated.
RECOMMENDATION:

Retain the AFRICOM OOD OCS CONOPS as developed for future use.

Review the standard plan and expand the OCS CONOPS to include all operational phases (ie, Phase 0 through V).

IMPLICATIONS:

None.

OBSERVATION - 7:

Instructions and guidance to the service components on Private Security Contracts, during contingency operations, must be prepared in advance to execute when needed.

DISCUSSION:

DoD Instruction 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSC) Operating in Contingency Operations, dated 22 Jul 09; AFRICOM provided its specific instruction within its AOR (draft in Sep 2010).

The service components voiced concerns (push back) of issuing Private Security Contracts during the OCS CONOPS development.

Under the current contracting authority within the Navy, FISC Naples is not capable of issuing these types of contracts to support the JTF if they become the lead service for contracting. The authority resides at NAVSUP. However, executing PSCs would be a new process and new contracting vehicle that would take some time for NAVSUP to execute.
RECOMMENDATION:

Recommend the service components be instructed to establish processes and procedures to manage PSCs during contingencies based on guidance provided by the COCOMs.

IMPLICATIONS:

Without established processes and procedures, establishing and executing a PSC policy during a contingency would be impossible.
APPENDIX C.   JCASO TRIP REPORT TO NAVSUP

16 Nov 11

MEMORANDUM FOR OPERATIONS OFFICER, JCASO

FROM:  Col Ed Keller, Director Mission Support Team 1

SUBJECT:  Trip Report – JCASO engagement with the Navy

1.  PURPOSE OF TRIP:  JCASO (Ops and Policy) met with the Navy’s NAVSUP HQ, Logistics Operation Center (LOC), and Global Logistics Support (GLS) to initiate OCS engagement from a strategic and operational level, to 1) provide a JCASO overview, and 2) establish partnership with the Navy by providing resources on the following topics:
   a)  Develop the OCS planning capability
   b)  Synchronize OCS efforts
   c)  Introduce JCASO’s Reserve Component capability
   d)  JCASO’s support from the HQ and at the COCOMs

2.  TRAVELERS:  Col Ed Keller, Director Mission Support Team 1, Lt Col Anna Morris, Policy Manager, LCDR Brian Henderson, Team 1 Logistics Planner, LCDR Emily Allen, Team 1 Engineer Officer, Maj Don Crawford, Team 2 Engineer Officer, and Capt Casey Crabill, Team 2 Logistics Planner

3.  ITINERARY:

   9 Nov:  JCASO Team met with the Navy.  Participants included:
   
   JCASO travelers
• CDR Courtney Turner, Director Mission Support Team 2 (Teleconference)
• CAPT Art Lopez, NAVSUP HQ Contracting Lead
• CAPT Drew Morgart, NAVSUP LOC N3
• CAPT Robert Heck, NAVSUP GLS (Teleconference)
• NAVSUP LOC N3 Team
• NAVSUP GLS Team (Teleconference)

4. DISCUSSION:

*The Navy’s agency roles in Contingency Contracting:*

• NAVSUP is the Navy’s Supporter for Contingency Contracting, with the exception of all types of construction contacts.
• NAVSUP HQ holds the Navy’s Contingency Contracting Authority for supplies and services; warrants the contracting officers at each Fleet Logistics Centers (FLCs).
• NAVSUP GLS manages the FLCs worldwide, but do not have the contracting authority.
• NAVSUP LOC provides the logistics planners for the Fleets (Navy Component). They have Logistics Planners embedded at each Fleet, and charged with performing OCS planning (similar to the JCASO model). Similar to JCASO planners, their planners have limited to no contracting background.
• NAVFAC executes the Navy’s construction (all types), engineering, real estate and Base Operating Support (BOS) and infrastructure related service contracts.
• These commands/agencies are independent from the Fleet. Each provides a supporting role to the Fleet. They are NOT subordinate to the Fleet. As the Fleet represents the Navy as the Service Component, NAVSUP’s activities are not always welcomed or allowed to represent the Fleet when meeting with the COCOMs that they support.

*The Navy’s vision in Contingency Contracting:*

• The new Chief of NAVSUP is a proponent of Navy’s participation in Joint OCS planning and execution
• Looking at possibility of providing logistics contract support to the USMC, by embedding planners and contracting officers with the MAGTF units.

*The Navy’s challenge in Contingency Contracting:*

1) In the event the Navy Component is designated for the Lead Service for Contracting (LSC) role, there are gaps between the Planners at the Fleet
(component level), Logistics Support at the Fleet (component level), and the Contracting Activity that supports the Fleet (Fleet Logistics Centers)

a) Lack of knowledge of each other’s roles/responsibilities or capabilities
b) Lack of communications
c) Planners and Logistics Support do not have a contracting background

2) The Navy is specialized in support of its Fleets at sea and pier side supply/resupply, during peacetime and contingency. Logistics support to the Fleet is provided or delivered by the organic forces as needed or contracting requirements are put in place during peacetime to be prepared for contingency. Therefore, contingency contracting, particularly in the joint environment, is a new concept of support. The capability of providing contingency contracting support in-land in Joint operations was not planned and resourced at the Service Level.

3) When designated as the LSC, the roles of the LSC are not well defined. The Navy is still learning and needs the COCOM and OSD to clearly define the requirements accompanying designation as the LSC. Further, they would welcome the pre-designation of LSC by the COCOMs as it would aid their planning and training.

4) COCOMs are not training/executing their Plans on the use of the LSC, as written, or are designating the LSC as they see fit as the operation or exercise occur, without necessarily consulting the Services themselves. This creates confusion for the service components and leaves them with no time to properly plan for the resources and execution.

5) Insufficient training for OCS planning and execution

a) Lack of OCS training and experience for the Navy’s planners. NAVSUP LOC is seeking training/courses to teach their Navy planners on staff estimate.
b) COCOM and Service’s exercises are focused on training the “Operators,” logistics/contracting support are secondary; while the logistics/contracting focused exercises do not have a realistic feed on the operational requirements.
c) In order to be effective, OCS MSELs need to be drafted with require action from the Operational Community rather than the OCS COI continuing to just task itself (e.g. MSEL would dictate that contract support is not available for security; what action should be taken in response?).

6) There are resource constraints in time, funding, and manning, to develop the OCS capability in support of Joint contingency operations. The Navy has a steep learning curve at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Way ahead on JCASO’s partnership with the Navy:

1) JCASO will assist the Navy as they develop their OCS planning capability. The Navy participants were interested and impressed with the OCS products developed to date:
   a) Shared JCASO Planner competency training package
   b) Development of a Contingency Contracting Course for the OCS community of interest
   c) Development of OCS Simulation to educate and train the OCS community of interest
   d) Shared and granted access to JCASO Harmonieweb to the NAVSUP teams
   e) Shared the Annex W guide and templates, and the LSC guide
   f) Provided JCASO Planners and JCASO Main contact information

2) The Navy’s participants realized the need to grow its OCS capability and are willing to utilize JCASO’s support to figure out the “HOW.”
   a) Getting the planners involved early in the planning process
   b) Better define the requirement process, and take on the ownership within the Navy as a whole
      i. Working with the Fleet to educate and communicate between the Planners, Logistics Support and the Contracting Activity
      ii. Working with the Fleet to participate in the contracting/OCS discussion with the COCOMs

3) JCASO will assist in the synchronization of OCS efforts when the Navy is designated as the LSC
   a) Assist to nest the Navy’s Annex W with the COCOM’s Annex W
   b) The Navy is interested in participating in the proposed EUCOM contracting “Council of Colonels,” to discuss strategic issues related to OCS, particularly pertaining to the areas of overlap during a contingency and feed the COCOM’s CLPSB. The participants will be kept at the HQ level at this time.
   c) Navy has been designated as the LSC for PANAMAX 12. JCASO will provide exercise support as needed
   d) The Navy will actively engage in the COCOM’s OCS Boards and Centers at the Action Officer level in order to support the O-6 level discussions
   e) The Navy is very interested in participating in the upcoming OCS Conference

4) JCASO shared information on its Reserve Component capability and its success at SOUTHCOM supporting FLC Jax.

5. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS:
The engagement with Navy Contingency Contracting Supporter was a success. The JCASO Team and our OCS products made a strong impression with the contracting activities. They were very pleased and appreciative of our presence and efforts to collaborate. Following action items were generated for further collaboration and coordination:

1) JCASO: Takes the lead to coordinate with EUCOM and AFRICOM to outline and initiate the contracting “Council of Colonels” to consider AO-derived initiatives from the CCWG/CRWG, as an input to the EUCOM and AFRICOM CLPSBs
2) JCASO: Grant registration access to the AO list provided
3) JCASO: Engage COCOMs and Joint Staff on the LSC Designation
4) JCASO: JCASO Planners help to synchronize Navy Component and COCOM Annex Ws
5) JCASO: Assist the Navy in developing their Planner’s training plan
6) Navy: Deconflict the Navy’s internal challenges with the Fleet and the Contracting Activities
7) Navy: participate in the COCOMs’ OCS working groups
8) Navy: participate in the upcoming OCS conference

Please direct questions to the undersigned.

//dek//

Col Ed Keller, USAF

Director, Mission Support Team 1
APPENDIX D. BIOGRAPHIES

The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

In January of 2001, The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler joined the faculty of the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs, where he holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise. He teaches graduate school courses, and leads the School’s new Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, which fosters collaboration among the public, private and non-profit sectors in order to promote mutually beneficial public and private interests.

Previously, Dr. Gansler served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics from November 1997 until January 2001. In this position, he was responsible for all matters relating to Department of Defense acquisition, research and development, logistics, acquisition reform, advanced technology, international programs, environmental security, nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, and the defense technology and industrial base. (He had an annual budget of over $180 Billion, and a workforce of over 300,000.)

Prior to this appointment, Dr. Gansler was Executive Vice President and Corporate Director for TASC, Incorporated, an applied information technology company, in Arlington, Virginia (from 1977 to 1997) during which time he played a major role in
building the company from a small operation into a large, widely-recognized and greatly-respected corporation, serving both the government and the private sector.

From 1972 to 1977, he served in the government as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Materiel Acquisition), responsible for all defense procurements and the defense industry; and as Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics) responsible for all defense electronics Research and Development.


Dr. Gansler has served on numerous Corporation Boards of Directors, and governmental special committees and advisory boards: including Vice Chairman, Defense Science Board; Chairman, Board of Visitors, Defense Acquisition University; Director, Procurement Round Table; Chairman, Industry Advisory Board, University of Virginia, School of Engineering; Chairman, Board of Visitors, University of Maryland, School of Public Affairs; member of the FAA Blue Ribbon Panel on Acquisition Reform; and senior consultant to the “Packard Commission” on Defense Acquisition Reform.

Additionally, from 1984 to 1997, Dr. Gansler was a Visiting Scholar at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (a frequent guest lecturer in Executive Management courses). He is the author of 3 books, a contributing author of 23 other books, author of over 100 papers, and a frequent speaker and Congressional witness.

Dr. Gansler holds a BE (Electrical Engineering) Yale University, a MS (Electrical Engineering) Northeastern University, a MA (Political Economy) New School for Social Research, and a Ph.D. (Economics) American University.
Rear Admiral Ron J. MacLaren

Director, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office

Rear Admiral MacLaren assumed his current position as the director, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), Defense Logistics Agency, in March 2010. JCASO is being established to orchestrate, synchronize and integrate program management of contingency acquisition across combatant commands and U.S. Government agencies during pre-conflict operations, contingency operations and combat operations.

MacLaren, was born in Seoul, Korea, but was raised in Mexico, Peru and the Panama Canal Zone. He graduated from the University of Southern California with a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and holds a Masters in Business Administration from Auburn University. He received his commission as a Supply Corps officer through the ROTC in 1979.

At sea, he served as assistant stock control officer, wardroom officer and sales officer aboard USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Ashore, MacLaren served as the material officer, Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair in Jacksonville, Fla. After transitioning to the Reserves, MacLaren served as commodore, Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group 3; commander, Navy Supply Support Battalion 2; commanding officer, Naval Operational Logistics Support Center Headquarters; commanding officer, Navy
Cargo Handling Battalion 12; commanding officer, Naval Supply Center Pensacola 109; chief of staff, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Force; deputy director, United States Pacific Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center; deputy director of Logistics, United States Joint Forces Command 206; officer in charge, Navy Cargo Handling Battalion 12, Detachment Alpha 109 and executive officer of Naval Supply Center Pensacola 109.

MacLaren’s staff assignments include Readiness Department head, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Force 109; Logistics Response Cell watch chief, United States Atlantic Command 206; operations officer, Advanced Based Functional Component Supply Support Unit (Medium) 209; Code 07A/Internal Review, Readiness Command Region 10; supply officer, Volunteer Training Unit 901; and training officer/supply officer, USS Talbot (FFG 4) 409.

Mobilized as the group commander, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group FORWARD GOLF in 2007–2008 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

After selection to flag rank, MacLaren was assigned as the assistant deputy chief of staff for Logistics, Fleet Supply and Ordnance, U.S. Pacific Fleet in October 2009. He was recalled to active duty in March 2010 in order to support his current position.

MacLaren pursued a civilian career as a hospital administrator, rising to the position of chief executive officer. He retired in 2004. In 2006, he became the health director for the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) on Martha’s Vineyard until he was recalled to active duty.

Personal awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), the Navy Commendation Medal (four awards), and the Navy Achievement Medal (two awards).
Rear Admiral Patricia E. Wolfe

Commander, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG)

Rear Adm. Wolfe was born and raised in northern New Jersey. She is a 1981 graduate of Villanova University with a Bachelor of Science in General Science, and received her commission through the Villanova Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. She received her Master of Business Administration in 1987 from Brenau University in Gainesville, Ga.

Wolfe’s active duty tours include sales and disbursing officer in USS *Piedmont* (AD 17), supply officer at Navy’s Cover and Deception Group II, and officer in charge (OIC) of resale activities at the Navy Supply Corps School in Athens, Ga. She immediately affiliated with the Navy Reserve following her release from active duty in 1987.


Wolfe has been recalled to active duty numerous times in support of Operations *Desert Storm*, *Sea Signal*, *Restore Democracy*, and twice for Operation *Enduring*
Freedom. She was most recently deployed in January 2010, as commander, Task Force Forty-Eight, Joint Logistics Hub at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in support of Operation Unified Response for Haiti earthquake relief efforts.

She was promoted to flag rank in October 2007. Her first flag assignment was as assistant deputy chief of staff for Logistics, Supply and Ordnance, commander Pacific Fleet, as well as commander, Logistics Task Force Pacific and commander, Naval Logistics Forces Korea. She is currently assigned as the commander, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, Williamsburg, Va.

Wolfe’s personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Gold Star, Joint Service Achievement Medal and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal.
CAPTAIN SCOTT W. BAILEY

Director, Supply Corps Personnel, Millington, TN.

Born and raised in San Jose, California, Captain Bailey graduated from San Jose State University in 1982 with a degree in Business Management. He attended Naval Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island and received his commission in February 1983. He completed training at Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia in August 1983. He earned a Masters in Business Administration from the College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia in 1996 and completed the Stanford University Graduate School of Business Senior Executive Education Program in 2005.

Following OCS and Supply Corps School, Captain Bailey reported as part of the re-commissioning crew in USS IOWA (BB 61) where he served as Food Service Officer, Disbursing Officer, Sales Officer, as well as a collateral duty of Secondary Battery Fire Control Officer. In April 1986 he reported to Naval Supply Center Oakland, California where he served as Administrative Assistant to the Commanding Officer; Director, Nuclear Weapons Supply Department; and as a Navy Acquisition Contracting Officer (NACO) intern. From Oakland he reported in January 1989 as Director of Purchasing for the Naval Supply Center San Diego, Long Beach Detachment, Long Beach, California. He reported aboard USS KIDD (DDG 993) as Supply Officer in April 1991 and was
deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, as well as deployed in counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific through mid-1994.

Following graduation from the College of William & Mary in 1996, Captain Bailey reported as the Director of Acquisition for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program in Washington, DC where he supervised the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate’s contracting activities for construction and overhaul on U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines, as well as the procurement of all reactors and propulsion components for the U.S. nuclear fleet. From September 2001 to April 2003 he served as Officer-in-Charge in USNS SAN JOSE (T-AFS 7) and deployed as part of the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) Strike Group in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Captain Bailey served as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Commander for Contracts, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. from 2003 to 2006. From 2006–2009, he was assigned as Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency Northern Europe in London, England.

Captain Bailey’s personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Navy Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), Navy Commendation Medal (three awards), Navy Achievement Medal, as well as various unit awards. He is designated a Surface Warfare Supply Corps Officer and is a member of the Acquisition Professional Community.
APPENDIX E. 10 USC 2333

10 USC § 2333. Joint policies on requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting.

(a) Joint Policy Requirement— The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations.

(b) Requirements Definition Matters Covered— The joint policy for requirements definition required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, provide for the following:

(1) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate experience and qualifications related to the definition of requirements to be satisfied through acquisition contracts (such as for delivery of products or services, performance of work, or accomplishment of a project), to act as head of requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, if required, including leading a requirements review board involving all organizations concerned.

(2) An organizational approach to requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations that is designed to ensure that requirements are defined in a way that effectively implements United States Government and Department of Defense objectives, policies, and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater of operations, and alignment of requirements with the proper use of funds.

(c) Contingency Program Management Matters Covered— The joint policy for contingency program management required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, provide for the following:

(1) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate program management experience and
qualifications, to act as head of program management during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple United States Government agencies and international organizations, if required.

(2) A preplanned organizational approach to program management during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations that is designed to ensure that the Department of Defense is prepared to conduct such program management.

(3) Identification of a deployable cadre of experts, with the appropriate tools and authority, and trained in processes under paragraph (6).

(4) Utilization of the hiring and appointment authorities necessary for the rapid deployment of personnel to ensure the availability of key personnel for sufficient lengths of time to provide for continuing program and project management.

(5) A requirement to provide training (including training under a program to be created by the Defense Acquisition University) to program management personnel in—

(A) the use of laws, regulations, policies, and directives related to program management in combat or contingency environments;

(B) the integration of cost, schedule, and performance objectives into practical acquisition strategies aligned with available resources and subject to effective oversight; and

(C) procedures of the Department of Defense related to funding mechanisms and contingency contract management.

(6) Appropriate steps to ensure that training is maintained for such personnel even when they are not deployed in a contingency operation.

(7) Such steps as may be needed to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination in the area of program management during contingency operations.

(d) Contingency Contracting Matters Covered—
(I) The joint policy for contingency contracting required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, provide for the following:

(A) The designation of a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service in each military department with the responsibility for administering the policy.

(B) The assignment of a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of contingency contracting during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, who shall report directly to the commander of the combatant command in whose area of responsibility the operations occur.

(C) A sourcing approach to contingency contracting that is designed to ensure that each military department is prepared to conduct contingency contracting during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving interagency organizations, if required.

(D) A requirement to provide training (including training under a program to be created by the Defense Acquisition University) to contingency contracting personnel in—

(i) the use of law, regulations, policies, and directives related to contingency contracting operations;

(ii) the appropriate use of rapid acquisition methods, including the use of exceptions to competition requirements under section 2304 of this title, sealed bidding, letter contracts, indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity task orders, set asides under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)), undefinitized contract actions, and other tools available to expedite the delivery of goods and services during combat operations or post-conflict operations;

(iii) the appropriate use of rapid acquisition authority, commanders’ emergency response program funds, and other tools unique to contingency contracting; and
(iv) instruction on the necessity for the prompt transition from the use of rapid acquisition authority to the use of full and open competition and other methods of contracting that maximize transparency in the acquisition process.

(E) Appropriate steps to ensure that training is maintained for such personnel even when they are not deployed in a contingency operation.

(F) Such steps as may be needed to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination in the area of contingency contracting.

(2) To the extent practicable, the joint policy for contingency contracting required by subsection (a) should be taken into account in the development of interagency plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations, consistent with the report submitted by the President under section 1035 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364; 120 Stat. 2388) on interagency operating procedures for the planning and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

(e) Training for Personnel Outside Acquisition Workforce—

(1) The joint policy for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting required by subsection (a) shall provide for training of military personnel outside the acquisition workforce (including operational field commanders and officers performing key staff functions for operational field commanders) who are expected to have acquisition responsibility, including oversight duties associated with contracts or contractors, during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.

(2) Training under paragraph (1) shall be sufficient to ensure that the military personnel referred to in that paragraph understand the scope and scale of contractor support they will experience in contingency operations and are prepared for their roles and responsibilities with regard to requirements definition, program management (including contractor oversight), and contingency contracting.
(3) The joint policy shall also provide for the incorporation of contractors and contract operations in mission readiness exercises for operations that will include contracting and contractor support.

(f) **Definitions**— In this section:

(1) **Contingency contracting personnel**— The term “contingency contracting personnel” means members of the armed forces and civilian employees of the Department of Defense who are members of the defense acquisition workforce and, as part of their duties, are assigned to provide support to contingency operations (whether deployed or not).

(2) **Contingency contracting**— The term “contingency contracting” means all stages of the process of acquiring property or services by the Department of Defense during a contingency operation.

(3) **Contingency operation**— The term “contingency operation” has the meaning provided in section 101(a)(13) of this title.

(4) **Acquisition support agencies**— The term “acquisition support agencies” means Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities that carry out and provide support for acquisition-related activities.

(5) **Contingency program management**— The term “contingency program management” means the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the combined efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and organizations for the management of a specific defense acquisition program or programs during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.

(6) **Requirements definition**— The term “requirements definition” means the process of translating policy objectives and mission needs into specific requirements, the description of which will be the basis for awarding acquisition contracts for projects to be accomplished, work to be performed, or products to be delivered.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California